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Remedies for Oppression of Non-Controlling
Shareholders in Illinois Closely-Held Corporations:
An Idea Whose Time Has Gone
Timothy J. Storm*

I. INTRODUCTION

The Illinois Business Corporation Act ("BCA") provides that a noncontrolling shareholder in an Illinois closely-held corporation,' who is
the victim of "oppression" committed by those in control of the
corporation, may be entitled to judicial dissolution of the corporation or
other remedies. 2 Although numerous other claims are available to noncontrolling shareholders relating to improper behavior by those in
control, courts and commentators overwhelmingly view the availability
of remedies for oppression as a key protection against
the arbitrary and
'3
heavy-handed conduct of "controlling shareholders. "

*

Principal, Timothy J. Storm, P.C.; J.D., cum laude, John Marshall Law School, 1992; B.A.,

University of Chicago, 1986. The author expresses his appreciation to Dawn E. Kahn, who
assisted in the preparation of this article.
I. "[A] close corporation is one in which the stock is held in a few hands, or in a few families,
and wherein it is not at all, or only rarely, dealt in by buying or selling." Galler v. Galler, 203
N.E.2d 577, 583 (Ill.
1964) (citing Brooks v. Willcuts, 78 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1935)). The
Illinois legislature has defined "non-public corporation" to mean "a corporation that has no shares
listed on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more
members of a national or affiliated securities association." Business Corporation Act, 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a) (2000 & West Supp. 2001). There has been little or no practical
difficulty in determining whether a particular corporation is or is not, in fact, a "closely-held"
corporation because the corporations at issue in the reported Illinois decisions are clearly one or
the other.
2. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b). The Illinois Business Corporation Act recognizes the
possibility of oppression by "directors or those in control of the corporation." 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/12.56(a)(3). For purposes of this Article, which focuses upon relations between
shareholders, only oppression by controlling shareholders will be addressed.
3. This Article uses the functional terms "controlling" and "non-controlling," rather than
"majority" and "minority" to identify shareholders or groups of shareholders acting together.
Although "control" and majority stock ownership are usually synonymous in closely-held
corporations, that is not necessarily the case. See 1 JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS §§
11.10, 11.51 n.1 (Supp. 2001).
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This Article critically examines oppression as a basis for noncontrolling shareholder remedies in Illinois closely-held corporations by
comparing the benefits of "oppression theory" 4 with its associated costs.
The basic outcome of that analysis is that the costs of oppression theory
substantially outweigh the demonstrated benefits. The oppression
theory has demonstrated little, if any, utility as a mechanism to protect
its intended beneficiaries-non-controlling shareholders of Illinois
closely-held corporations. Despite benefits that are modest (at best),
oppression theory creates substantial inefficiencies in corporate
governance and shareholder dispute resolution.
If oppression were eliminated as a basis for shareholder remedies,
non-controlling shareholders would continue to be adequately protected
by other means, efficiency in corporate governance would be enhanced,
and the courts would be relieved of unavailing and time-consuming
litigation flowing from oppression claims.
This Article begins with a brief overview of the existing protections
afforded non-controlling shareholders in Illinois. 5
This Article
6
continues with a discussion of the benefits of the oppression theory.
Next, this Article presents the arguments against the oppression theory
including the development of the theory in Illinois. 7 Finally, this Article
concludes that the oppression theory is not necessary for the protection
8
of non-shareholder interests.
II. PROTECTION OF NON-CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS IN ILLINOIS
Mistreatment of non-controlling shareholders by those in control is
often mentioned as one of the most significant problems in the
governance of closely-held corporations. 9 Illinois law has responded by
providing a number of mechanisms to protect non-controlling
shareholders. The BCA provides that a court may dissolve an Illinois
non-public corporation, or provide other remedies to non-controlling
shareholders, upon a finding that the "directors or those in control of the
corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal,
oppressive, or fraudulent with respect to the petitioning shareholder
4. As used in this Article, "oppression theory" means the availability to non-controlling
shareholders of a remedy for oppressive conduct by a controlling shareholder.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part lI.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.
9. See Edwin J. Bradley, A Comparative Assessment of the California Close Corporation
Provisions and a ProposalforProtecting Individual Participants,9 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 865, 86567(1976).
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0
whether in his or her capacity as a shareholder, director, or officer."'
In addition, Illinois law imposes fiduciary duties upon shareholders in a
closely-held corporation which further limits the prerogatives of control
and provides corresponding protection for those not in control."
Thus, not easily pigeon-holed, Illinois statutory and common law
prohibits four (not necessarily mutually exclusive) general categories of
conduct by those in control of closely-held corporations: (1) illegality,
(2) fraud, (3) breach of fiduciary duties, and (4) oppression. 12 The
following section briefly addresses the scope and application of the first
three categories as a background to understanding the role of oppression
in Illinois corporate governance law.

A. Illegality, Fraudand FiduciaryDuty
First, corporate governance provisions of the BCA limit the
discretion of controlling shareholders both procedurally and
substantively. Those provisions generally take the form of guarantees
that all shareholders will have adequate notice of intended corporate
action, 13 access to information 14 and the right to participate in decisionmaking, to the extent of their holdings, by voting1 5 at required annual
shareholder meetings. 16
. Second, controlling shareholders are prohibited from using their
positions to defraud the other shareholders. A common examples of
proscribed conduct is self-dealing transactions, in which the controlling
shareholder uses corporate assets for his own benefit, either individually
or through another controlled business entity. 17
Third, modern fiduciary duty analysis in the closely-held Illinois
corporation equates co-shareholders to partners: the "decision to form
and operate as a corporation rather than a partnership does not change
the fact that [the shareholders] were embarking on a joint enterprise,
and their mutual duties and obligations were similar to those of

10. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)(3) (West Supp. 2001). The Illinois Business
Corporation Act follows the provisions of § 97(a) of the Model Business Corporation Act.
MODEL Bus. CORP ACT § 97(a) (1969) (current version at MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
14.30(2)(ii) (1998)).
11. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7 (1993 & West Supp. 2001).
12. See infra Part ILA-B.
13. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.15 (1993).
14. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.30, 7.75 (1993).
15. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.40 (1993 & West Supp. 2001).
16. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.05 (1993).
App. Ct. 1993).
17. See, e.g., Kalabogias v. Georgou, 627 N.E.2d 51, 57 (I11.
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partners."' 18 Thus, controlling shareholders are subject to duties as if
19
they were the partners of their non-controlling counterparts.
The principles of fraud and fiduciary duty and the interpretation of
the BCA have been developed and refined through long and consistent
application of the law in Illinois. In addition, the laws of Delaware and
other popular venues of incorporation provide useful guidance in
interpretation and application of fiduciary duties. 20 By contrast, the
concept of oppression 21remains so strikingly undefined as to be
described as "nebulous."
B. Oppression Theory in Illinois
Oppression is often used (and misused) to describe in general any
mistreatment of a non-controlling shareholder. Although entire treatises
have been written on the subject of minority shareholder oppression, 22 a
precise definition remains elusive. This lack of a precise definition is
especially true in Illinois. Illinois corporation statutes have provided
remedies for oppressive conduct since 1933,23 although the term has not
been statutorily defined. Case law is also devoid of a generallyapplicable definition. Oddly, much of the relevant case law defines
oppression more by what it is not, than by what it is. 24 In addition, it is
18. Tilley v. Shippee, 147 N.E.2d 347, 352 (I11.
1958).
19. The problems of self-interested dealings are not, of course, confined to closely-held
corporations and fiduciary analysis is applicable to all corporations in some form. See 1 COX ET
AL., supra note 3, §§ 11.10, 11.51 n.1 (discussing that although "control" and majority stock
ownership are usually synonymous in closely-held corporations, that is not always the case).
20. In some instances, the law establishes rights and duties which apply mutually between
stockholders, regardless of the magnitude of their respective ownership positions. In other
instances, the scope of the right or duty is defined by the stockholder's status as "majority" or
"controlling" stockholder as distinguished from "minority" or "non-controlling stockholder." In
addition, certain rights and duties of stockholders apply regardless of whether the corporation is
publicly traded or closely-held, while other duties may be implicated only in the "close" context.
21. Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Ground for CorporateDissolution, 1965 DUKE L.J.
128, 129 (1965).
22. See, e.g., 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 2001).
23. Oppression was listed as a ground for dissolution in the Illinois Business Corporation Act
of 1933. Cent. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 141 N.E.2d 45, 49 (I11.
1957) [hereinafter Cent.
Standard Il]; see also Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority
Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425,
455 (1990) (stating that the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1933 introduced the concept of
oppression as a basis for liquidation).
24. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court stated, in an oft-quoted passage:
Plaintiff argues that the word "oppressive" does not necessarily savor of fraud, and that
the absence of "mismanagement, or misapplication of assets" does not prevent a
finding that the conduct of the defendants has been oppressive. We agree with that
interpretation, and we reject defendants' argument that the word is substantially
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evident that oppression does not merely overlap with the other grounds
for relief (i.e., illegality, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty) in that
oppressive conduct "does not necessarily savor of fraud, and the
absence of mismanagement, or misapplication of assets, does not
prevent a finding that the conduct of the dominant directors or officers
has been oppressive; the word is not synonymous with illegal or
the realm of
fraudulent." 25 Finally, whether certain conduct falls within
26
case.
each
of
facts
the
from
oppression must be determined
It is not difficult to understand how oppression gained its reputation
as a "nebulous" claim. 27 Nevertheless, courts and commentators are
quick to point out that oppression theory gains much of its vitality from
its flexibility. To define oppression too exclusively or narrowly, they
argue, would encourage behavior at the margins of
acceptability--directly contrary to the 28intended result of broad
protection for non-controlling shareholders.
III.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF OPPRESSION THEORY

Commentators have almost universally applauded the expansion of
minority stockholder rights and remedies in general and oppression
theory in particular. 29 Among the various claims that may be asserted

Misapplication of assets or
synonymous with "illegal" and "fraudulent."
mismanagement of funds are not, as we read the statute, indispensable ingredients of
"oppressive" conduct.
Cent. Standard11, 141 N.E.2d at 50.
1960) (quoting Cent.
25. Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 135 (I11.
Standard 11,141 N.E.2d at 50) (relying on the interpretation of § 210 of the British Companies
Act in Elder v. Elder & Watson, 1952 Sess. Cas. 49, 55).
26. The court said, for instance, in Gray v. Hall:
[A]ctions which might be oppressive under one set of circumstances would not be
oppressive under others. For instance, the paying of large salaries to corporate officers
might be justified where a corporation has large retained earnings. This same behavior
might be oppressive where the corporation is unable to pay dividends to minority
stockholders, due to large salaries drawn by officer-majority stockholders. Similarly,
the non-payment of dividends might indicate oppressive behavior where the
corporation retains large amounts of earnings for no apparent reason except to "freeze
out" minority stockholders. The non-payment of dividends by a corporation cannot be
determined to be oppressive except when viewed in the backdrop of the corporation's
overall financial picture.
App. Ct. 1973).
Gray v. Hall, 295 N.E.2d 506, 509 (I11.
27. Comment, supra note 21, at 129.
28. William R. Quinlan & John F. Kennedy, The Rights and Remedies of Shareholders in
Closely Held CorporationsUnder Illinois Law, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 585, 615 (1998).
29. See, e.g., Thomas J. Bamonte, Expanding the Fiduciary Duties of Close Corporation
Shareholders: The Dilemma Facing Illinois Corporate Law, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 257, 259-60
(1995) (discussing the pros and cons of applying heightened fiduciary duties in close
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by a dissatisfied non-controlling shareholder, oppression has been cited
as the "provision that empirically seems to be the most fruitful avenue
30
for minority shareholders to pursue."
There are three important assumptions underlying the arguments in
favor of oppression theory. First, due to unique aspects of the closelyheld corporation, the traditional panoply of laws regulating corporate
governance in general does not adequately protect non-controlling
shareholders in the closely-held corporation. Second, owners of
closely-held corporations routinely fail to contract for protections that
non-controlling shareholders ought to enjoy. Finally, oppression theory
effectively fills the void left by the combination of inadequate legal
restraints on the controlling shareholder's behavior and the participants'
lack of planning in that regard.
A. The Unique Nature of the Closely-Held Corporation
One of the arguments favoring the availability of a claim for
oppression is the absence of a public market for the stock of closelyheld corporations. 31 Minority shareholders in a corporation with a
public market for its stock can "vote with their feet" if they feel
themselves oppressed or otherwise mistreated by those in control.32
Thus, the possibility of oppression is essentially eliminated in the
context of a publicly traded corporation-at least one providing
reasonable liquidity and meaningful exit opportunities.
By contrast, the non-controlling shareholder in a closely-held
corporation usually has no ready buyer other than the controlling
shareholder-and sometimes even that is not an option. 33 A claim for
oppression (or the threat of asserting such a claim) acts as a partial
substitute for the public market by creating a valve to release the
34
pressure of oppressive behavior.

corporations); Quinlan & Kennedy, supra note 28, at 594-98 (exploring the nature of the
relationships of closely-held corporations and how to avoid disputes).
30. Murdock, supra note 23, at 455.
31. 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORP. § 9.02 (3d ed.
1986 & Supp. 2001); Bamonte, supra note 29, at 259; Quinlan & Kennedy, supra note 28, at 588.
32. 2 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 31, § 9.02, at 4 ("[A] shareholder in a close
corporation does not have the exit option available to a shareholder in a publicly held corporation,
who can sell shares in a securities market if dissatisfied with the way the corporation is being
operated.").
33. The majority shareholder has little economic incentive to acquire the remaining stock
other than the opportunity to avoid the costs associated with the presence of the minority
shareholder(s).
34. That justification has been criticized. It has been suggested that illiquidity in itself is not
the real problem facing an oppressed shareholder. In the case of a non-controlling shareholder
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Another unique aspect of the closely-held corporation, which
suggests, some argue, the need for special protection for the noncontrolling shareholder, is that the owners of a closely-held corporation
are quite often its managers as well.35 Supporters of oppression theory
argue that the identity of ownership and management creates an
incentive for the controlling owner-manager to use his dual positions to
over-compensate himself to the detriment of owners who are not
managers or who are not in a position of control.36
B. The Participants'Lack of Planning
There is little doubt that the participants in a closely-held corporation
can contract for particular rights between themselves that would
essentially redirect most, if not all, ensuing disputes from claims of
oppression to traditional contract actions. However, that possibility
does not necessarily translate into practical application.
Proponents of oppression theory point out that participants in closelyheld corporations very often (perhaps usually, although this has never
been proven) do not avail themselves of the many planning
opportunities available to them. 37 Instead, the participants approach the
venture as more of a slightly formalized partnership in which they do
not fully comprehend the need for planning. 38 That approach is said to
arise from several different causes, including: the non-controlling
shareholder's ignorance of his potential vulnerability, a trust in one's
co-venturers that approaches naivete, and a sort of irrational exuberance

who is subject to extreme oppression at the hands of those in control, even a liquid market would
be of little assistance because the oppression so severely impacts the value of his investment that
he would find no buyers. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 230-31 (1991).
35. Quinlan & Kennedy, supra note 28, at 588.
36. The contrary argument is that the combination of ownership control and management
control in privately-held companies does not necessarily create greater difficulties for those not in
control than does the separation of ownership and management in publicly traded companies. In
the end, the manager (whether he is a controlling owner, a non-controlling owner or not an owner
at all) has an incentive to increase his compensation as manager to its highest possible level,
while still maintaining his managerial position. One might well question whether that optimum
level would differ between two otherwise identical businesses--one publicly owned, the other
privately held. Economic efficiency theory would suggest that the wide variety of investment
vehicles available in the market would tend to minimize the divergences in compensations
between managers of closely held corporations and those in publicly held companies.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 34, at 230-31.
37. Murdock, supra note 23, at 426.
38. Carol L. Isreals, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence, Problems of Deadlock and
Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 778, 778-79 (1952).
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for the new venture that overwhelms caution. 39 Whether it is that
combination of factors or some other, it is fairly apparent that planning
for the closely-held corporation is far from universal.4 °
C. The Need to Fill the Void
The perceived need for special protection of the non-controlling
shareholder in the closely-held corporation, together with the very
common absence of planning by the participants, has resulted in the
creation of special remedies in the law for this special class of
investors. 4 1 Proponents of oppression theory often attribute that
development to the intervention of the legislature and courts to fill the
"void" in shareholder protection. 42
Perhaps a more compelling explanation of the development of
oppression theory involves an economic efficiency analysis.
Oppression theory-as well as other types of shareholder protection,
such as imposition of fiduciary duties-may be viewed as standardized
terms in the agreement between the parties. 43 In that way, the noncontrolling shareholder is protected, even if he did not have the leverage
or the foresight to bargain individually for those protections. However,
to be effective and efficient, that argument only goes so far because the
terms implied in law must be similar to the bargain that the parties
would have struck had they addressed the issues. Thus, the argument
runs, efficiency is enhanced by giving the parties the benefit of their
bargain without the transaction costs that they would have incurred to
44
reach the bargain themselves.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST OPPRESSION THEORY
As noted above, both courts and commentators overwhelmingly favor
the availability of remedies for oppressed non-controlling shareholders
in closely-held corporations. 45 But several substantial objections to the
availability of remedies for oppression are routinely overlooked in the

39. Murdock, supra note 23, at 426 ("[People enter closely-held businesses in the same
manner as they enter marriage: optimistically and ill-prepared.").
40. One of the common factors of litigated shareholder disputes is the absence of a
shareholder agreement or the shareholder's failure to update the agreement to reflect changed
circumstances.
41. Quinlan & Kennedy, supra note 28, at 588; Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's
Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus. LAW 699, 707-26 (1993).
42. Thompson, supra note 41, at 707-26.
43. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 34, at 247-48.
44. Id. at 251-52.
45. See supra Part III (discussing the arguments in favor of oppression theory).
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face of the generally favorable commentary on the topic. Many of those
objections rest upon basic economic analysis.
No one doubts that shareholder dissension in closely-held
corporations creates costs to the enterprise itself arising from a number
of factors, including: ineffective use of management time, diversion of
resources from high-return projects to litigation, interference with the
company's ability to obtain financing and, ultimately, potential failure
of the business. 46 The negative effects of shareholder dissension are felt
beyond the enterprise, impacting the economy and taxing scarce judicial
47
resources.
The logical and efficient public policy response to shareholder
dissension would be the creation of mechanisms to avoid or quickly
resolve those disputes with the goal of reducing the resulting
inefficiencies. Efficient standards minimize waste. 48 However, rather
than address and resolve inefficiencies, oppression theory creates costs
of its own. 49 As will be demonstrated below, those costs overwhelm
any benefits.
There are four primary costs created by oppression theory, each of
which will be addressed in this Article. First, rather than filling an
endemic "void" in planning, oppression theory seems to create a void
by serving as a partial (albeit unsatisfactory) substitute for corporate
governance planning. 50 Second, the unsatisfactory nature of oppression
theory as a void filler is evident because the current Illinois formulation
of oppression leaves controlling shareholders without the kind of clear
guidelines for avoiding oppressive behavior 51 that would be created by
effective planning. Third, to the extent that oppression fills a void in
planning, it does so by creating a rule that corporate governance by
unanimity is the only safe harbor for the controlling shareholder.5 2 The
final objection, flowing from the convergence of the series of problems
outlined above, is that oppression theory tends to increase the costs and
53
severity of shareholder disputes.

46. Steven C. Bahis, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate
Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 287 (1990).
47. Id. at 286.
48. Id. at 318.
49. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 34, at 238.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See
See
See
See

infra Part IV.B.
infra Part IV.C.
infra Part IV.D.
infra Part I.E.
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Each of these arguments is addressed in some detail below.
However, proponents of oppression theory may meet each argument
with the retort that considerations of "shareholder rights," of which
oppression is considered to be a key component in Illinois, must be the
paramount concern. In sum, proponents argue that, whatever its direct
and collateral costs, oppression theory is an effective means to protect
non-controlling shareholders and that its scope should be expanded.54
It appears that those commentators may have seriously overestimated
the true benefits of oppression claims to non-controlling shareholders.
Notwithstanding the broad purposes of oppression theory and the
sweeping rhetoric used by many Illinois courts, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to find a reported Illinois appellate opinion in which the
assertion of an oppression claim has resulted in a meaningful benefit to
a minority shareholder separate from other claims that were, or could
have been, asserted. In other words, the non-controlling shareholder in
those cases would have been fully protected by asserting claims for
breach of fiduciary duty, illegality or fraud, without invoking
oppression.
The next section of this Article examines the utility of the oppression
claim through a case-by-case analysis of reported Illinois appellate
opinions addressing oppression. 55 The sections that follow expand upon
the four policy-based objections to oppression theory that are noted
56
above.
A. Oppression Theory is Ineffective
An analysis of Illinois cases leads one to conclude that the actual
efficacy of oppression as a basis for non-controlling shareholder
remedies is much less certain than the rhetoric employed by courts and
commentators might lead one to believe. Upon examination, oppression
57
does not seem to be a very "fruitful avenue for minority shareholders"
after all. Instead, while often giving lip service to oppression in broad
and sweeping terms, the decisions of Illinois courts are best understood
as being grounded not in the rather slippery notion of oppression, but
instead in better defined claims for illegality, fraud or breach of
fiduciary duty.
In addition, a chronological review of those cases shows that the
development of oppression law in Illinois is characterized not by a
54. See, e.g., Murdock, supra note 23, at 455; Quinlan & Kennedy, supra note 28, at 585.
55. See infra Part IV.A (discussing how oppression theory is ineffective).
56. See text accompanying supra notes 50-53.
57. Murdock, supra note 23, at 455.
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consistent evolution, but by three distinct stages. Oppression began its
life in Illinois primarily as a means of assuring that the "drastic"
dissolution remedy was employed only in egregious situations in which
it was truly warranted.58 In the second stage, the oppression concept
came to be applied more as a substantive wrong that included conduct
essentially amounting to breach of the controlling shareholder's
fiduciary duties. 59 Finally, when the BCA was amended to make
remedies other than dissolution available to shareholders, the oppression
concept changed again. 60 The analysis in the third stage focused not on
the wrongful conduct of the controlling shareholder, but on whether the
controlling shareholder's governance of the corporation fulfilled the
non-controlling shareholder's
reasonable expectations for his
61
participation in the corporation.
1. First Stage-Oppression as a Unification Principle
The Illinois courts' options for granting relief to a non-controlling
shareholder were limited originally to dissolution or nothing. 62 Because
63
dissolution traditionally has been considered a "drastic" remedy,
courts were naturally circumspect in granting the remedy. 64 Although
oppression was listed in the BCA as an independent and distinct ground
for dissolution, the courts actually used oppression as shorthand to
indicate that the wrongful acts of the controlling shareholder were not
merely isolated incidents or unrelated occurrences, but instead
amounted to a continuing course of conduct that would justify the
drastic dissolution remedy. 65 Thus, oppression could apply to many
sorts of inherently wrongful-although not necessarily illegal or
fraudulent--conduct which, individually, might not rise to the level of
concern necessary to justify dissolution.

58. See infra Part IV.A. I (discussing the unification principle of oppression theory).
59. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing how oppression theory is a breach of duty).
60. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the reasonable expectations of oppression theory).
61. Interestingly, at least one commentator has suggested that the application of fiduciary duty
principles has undergone a three-stage development that seems to roughly parallel the
development of oppression theory. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of FiduciaryDuty in Close
Corporations,138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1680 (1990).
62. See infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text (describing the development of dissolution
as a remedy for oppression).
63. See, e.g., Cent. Standard If, 141 N.E.2d 45, 51 (111. 1957).
64. There is a background concern that the availability of forced dissolution as a remedy for
non-controlling shareholder claims may allow minority shareholders to exercise "retaliatory
oppression" against those in control. Bahls, supra note 46, at 296.
65. See infra notes 84-129 and accompanying text (illustrating oppression through a constant
course of conduct).
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The Illinois Supreme Court's 1957 decision in Central Standard Life
Insurance Co. v. Davis66 affirmed oppression as a basis for corporate
dissolution and provided many of the broad definitional platitudes 67 still
quoted today, but ironically resulted in no relief to the complaining
minority. 68 Central Standard was brought as a class action on behalf of
the preferred stockholders of Abraham Lincoln Hotel Company ("Hotel
Company"). 69 The Hotel Company built and owned a hotel that was
operated by the Abraham Lincoln Hotel Operating Company
("Operating Company").7 ° Of the multiple defendants named in the
lawsuit, defendant C. Hayden Davis owned controlling interests in both
71
the Hotel Company and the Operating Company.
The Hotel Company's only source of income was rent received from
the Operating Company. 72 The Hotel Company paid dividends to its
preferred shareholders from 1924 until 193 1.73 The genesis of the
plaintiff's claims was the Hotel Company's failure to pay dividends to
preferred shareholders after 193 1.74 When the complaint was filed, the
dividends owed to the preferred shareholders amounted to over one
million dollars.7 5
The plaintiff argued that the Hotel Company should be liquidated
because it would never be able to pay the accrued dividends on the
preferred stock and that the defendants' refusal to liquidate the company

66. Cent. StandardI, 141 N.E.2d at 45.
67. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 61, at 1697 (discussing "compilation of platitudes" in
Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)).
68. Indeed, there appear to be very few reported Illinois decisions analyzing the issue of
oppression in the two decades following the adoption of the Business Corporation Act in 1933.
See Marnik v. Northwestern Packing Co., 82 N.E.2d 195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1948) (Abstract only);
Lush'us Brand Distribs., Inc. v. Fort Dearborn Lithograph Co., 70 N.E.2d 737 (Ill. App. Ct.
1946); Sulinski v. Humboldt & Wabansia Bldg. Corp., 43 N.E.2d 181 (I11.App. Ct. 1942); Long
v. Wilson Stove & Mfg. Co., 277 I11.App. 57 (1934); see also Murdock, supra note 23, at 456.
69. Cent. Standard 11, 141 N.E.2d at 47. Significant to the facts of the case, the plaintiffs'
stock was cumulative preferred stock, which required payment of all dividends accrued on the
preferred stock before any dividend could be paid to the common shareholders. See id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Id. The court in Central StandardH noted that the full amount of the cumulated dividend
would have to be paid to preferred shareholders before any dividends could be paid to the
common shareholders. Id. Further, the cumulated dividends and the par value of the outstanding
preferred stock-or a total of some $1,750,000-would have to be paid to preferred holders on
liquidation of the Hotel Company before any payments would be made to common shareholders.
Id.
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was oppressive. 76 The plaintiff alleged only oppression, not illegal or
77
fraudulent conduct.
The trial court dismissed the case, finding no illegal, oppressive or
fraudulent conduct. 78 The appellate court stated that a "clear abuse of
79
trust" was sufficient to establish oppressive conduct under the BCA
and noted that the word oppressive in the BCA must be read separately
from "illegal" and "fraudulent." 80 The court seemed to struggle with
just what oppression should include, however, resorting to various
dictionary definitions of the term, including "unreasonably
burdensome," "unjustly severe," "tyrannical," and "overpowering to
spirit or senses." 8 1 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
holding, 82 apparently because there had been no showing of
"mismanagement, or misapplication of assets." 83
The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the "concept of oppressive
conduct as a ground for dissolution of a corporation in equity appears
for the first time in the 1933 act," 84 but there is no "authoritative
determination" of its "precise scope." 85 The court rejected the argument
that dissolution may not be granted as a remedy to minority
shareholders unless it is "demonstrated to a certainty that continuation
of the business must inevitably result in serious loss in the near
future." 86 The Central Standard court also rejected "defendants'
argument that the word [oppression] is substantially synonymous with
'illegal' and 'fraudulent."' 87 Unfortunately, the supreme court initiated
the trend in Illinois case law of defining "oppression" by stating what it
is not:
Plaintiff argues that the word "oppressive" does not necessarily savor
of fraud and that the absence of "mismanagement, or misapplication
of assets" does not prevent a finding that the conduct of the defendants

76. Id.
77. Id. at 49.
78. Id. at 48.
79. Cent. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 134 N.E.2d 653, 654 (I11.
App. Ct. 1956), affid, 141
N.E.2d 45 (Ill.
1957) [hereinafter Cent. Standard I].
80. Id. at 658-59.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 660.
83. Id. at 659.
84. Cent. Standard11,141 N.E.2d 45, 49 (111. 1957).
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Dixie Lumber Co. v. Hellams, 80 So. 872, 874 (Ala. 1919); Phinizy v. Anniston
City Land Co., 71 So. 469, 471 (Ala. 1916); Mfrs.' Land & Improvement Co. v. Cleary, 89 S.W.
248 (Ky. 1905); James F. Powers Foundry Co. v. Miller, 171 A. 842, 845 (Md. 1934)).
87. Cent. Standard II, 141 N.E.2d at 50.
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has been oppressive. We agree with that interpretation, and we reject
defendants' argument that the word is substantially synonymous with
"illegal" and "fraudulent."
Misapplication of assets or
mismanagement of funds are not, as we read the statute, indispensable
ingredients of "oppressive" conduct. 88
The Central Standard court's definition of oppression has become
the standard reference point for subsequent courts in oppression cases.
However, those succeeding opinions often miss an important element of
the court's analysis, relating to the economic reality of a minority
shareholder's decision to assume that position. That is, the noncontrolling shareholder's apparent disadvantage may simply reflect the
natural benefits of his bargain.
A plaintiff cannot complain of the continuation of a venture which,
though solvent, is not profitable, when he fails to show that he has not
already taken advantage of the situation he complains of in the price

that he paidfor his stock. Equity will not award the drastic relief here
sought in order
to aid a plaintiff in what might be a profitable
89
speculation.
Despite its broad language favoring remedies for oppression, the
Central Standard court held that the plaintiff was entitled to no relief
because "the record suggests that the company may shortly be in a
position to pay dividends on the preferred stock." 90 The court reached
that result even though the financial predicament of the preferred
shareholders appeared compelling. 9 1 Apparently the shareholders had
received no dividends for over thirty years and it appeared unlikely that
they would receive much at dissolution upon expiration of the
corporation's charter. 92 Nevertheless, the plaintiff's naked allegation of
oppression (without fraud, illegality or other distinct wrongdoing) was
93
unavailing.
Two years after Central Standard, the Illinois Supreme Court
revisited the concept of oppression with similar rhetoric but a markedly

88. Id. (relying upon the interpretation of § 210 of the British Companies Act in Elder v. Elder &
Watson, 1952 Sess. Cas. 49, 55).
89. Id. at 51 (emphasis added) (citing Wall & Beaver St. Corp. v. Munson Line, 58 F. Supp.
109, 116 (Md. 1944)).
90. Id. at 50. However, the Central StandardII court also noted that "it does not follow that
the preferred shareholders must await the termination of the life of the corporation before
distribution of its assets can be decreed.... Time may show that there is no reasonable prospect
of profitable operation. The present record does not." Id. at 51.
91. See id.at49.
92. See id. at 50.
93. Id.
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different result. Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co.94 is a classic
deadlock case in which the ownership of stock in Lanzit Corrugated
Box Co. ("Lanzit") was evenly split between two factions of the
Gidwitz family so that there were "neither majority or minority
stockholders" of Lanzit.95 The board of directors consisted of two
members from each of the Gidwitz family factions. 96 Before the family
rift occurred, Joseph Gidwitz-who headed the defendant faction-was
unanimously elected president. 97 As a result of that split, Joseph
became ensconced as president and was "able to manage, operate, and
control Lanzit almost as a sole proprietorship, while paying technical
respect to the existing corporate structure and the laws relating to
corporations.,98

The plaintiffs brought suit, asserting that both the directors and
shareholders of the corporation were deadlocked and claiming that the
defendants "committed illegal, oppressive and fraudulent acts," which
the plaintiffs specifically alleged and proved. 99 The trial court found
that the shareholders and the directors of Lanzit had been deadlocked
since 1950; that the shareholders had failed to elect new directors for
ten consecutive annual meetings; and that irreparable injury to the
corporation was "threatened by reason of the deadlock."'"
Significantly, the court also found that the defendants' acts were
"oppressive in that, through the medium of the deadlock among the
directors and the stockholders, said Defendants have been in control of
the Corporation for the last ten years by reason of Joseph being
President and chief executive officer." 10'
Based upon those findings,

94. Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131 (I11.
1960).
95. Id. at 135.
96. Id. at 134.
97. Id. at 135-36.
98. Id. at 136.
99. Id. at 133. Plaintiffs enumerated the following allegedly oppressive acts of the president
and others in the Lanzit control group: (1)The plaintiffs were deprived of participation in the
management of the corporation; (2) Joseph organized another corporation with Lanzit funds
without consulting plaintiffs and without board authorization and that corporation ultimately lost
a substantial amount of money; (3) The defendants refused to increase the board from four to five
members to break the ten-year deadlock; (4) Joseph improperly hired a corporate officer without
board approval; (5) Joseph made "arbitrary deductions" from Victor Gidwitz's salary; (6) Joseph
caused Lanzit to borrow money funds from a bank, from a company of which Joseph was
president and from a partnership in which Joseph was a partner, all without board approval; (7)
Joseph executed a proxy to himself to vote shares in a Lanzit subsidiary; and (8) Joseph failed to
consult any director except his brother on corporate policy decisions. Id. at 135.
100. Id. at 133.
101. Id.
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the trial court2 concluded that the plaintiffs had established the right to
0
liquidation.
The appeal was taken directly to the Illinois Supreme Court, 10 3 which
began its analysis by noting, incorrectly, that there
appears to be no claim that the acts of the directors or officers in this
case are "illegal" or "fraudulent," but only that the "deadlock" is
"oppressive" to plaintiffs as shareholders because they, as directors,
are precluded thereby from participating at the policy level in the
direction and supervision of Joseph Gidwitz's activities as president of
the corporation. 104

The court cited to the familiar Central Standard proposition, in stating
that the word oppressive
does not carry an essential inference of imminent disaster; it can
contemplate a continuing course of conduct. The word does not
necessarily savor of fraud, and the absence of "mismanagement, or
misapplication of assets," does not prevent a finding that the conduct
of the dominant directors or officers has been
oppressive. It is not
10 5
synonymous with "illegal" and "fraudulent."'
The court further noted that the "essential attribute of a shareholder in a
corporation is that he is entitled to participate, according to the amount
of his stock, in the selection of the management of the corporation,
and
16
he cannot be deprived or deprive himself of that power."'
The court suggested that the mere fortuity of Joseph having been
president at the time the fifty-fifty split occurred should not subvert the
principles of shareholder participation and majority control. 10 7 In
addition, the court noted that Joseph "used his position as president of a
closely held corporation, split fifty-fifty in stock ownership ...

to

completely control and manage the corporation without majority stock
10 8
support."
Although the court erroneously suggested that no illegality had been
alleged, it went on to catalog a host of acts or omissions in violation of
the BCA and Lanzit's bylaws. Among other things, the Lanzit
shareholders were deprived of their rights to vote for directors during

102. Id. at 133-34.
103. Id. at 134.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 135 (quoting Cent. StandardH, 141 N.E.2d 45 (II1. 1957)).
106. Id. (citing Laughlin v. Johnson, 230 I11.App. 25 (1923); Colton v. Williams, 65 I11.App.
466 (1896)).
107. See id. at 136.
108. Id. at 138.
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the ten years when no annual shareholder meetings had been held. 1°9
Moreover, although one special meeting of shareholders had been held
during that time, Joseph improperly ruled out of order a proposal that
the number of directors be increased from four to five." While a few
meetings of the board of directors were held during the ten-year period,
no matters of business or corporate policy were presented to the
board."' As a result of this failure to hold meaningful shareholder and
board meetings, Joseph was also able to avoid the obligation imposed
upon the president
by the bylaws, to report on the operations of the
2
corporation. 11
The court also found that Joseph exceeded his authority as president
in connection with a number of his corporate decisions and was further
troubled by Joseph's failure to consult with the board before approving
interest-bearing loans made to Lanzit by entities controlled by
Joseph. 113 Joseph was never granted authority by Lanzit's shareholders
or directors to arrange the loans and, "in effect, borrowed from himself
114
and realized a profit thereon."
In addition, the court also found that the "record ...supports
numerous acts of hostility toward and deprivation of the rights of Victor
Gidwitz and Carrie Gidwitz as stockholders." 115 In summary, the court
found that the "improper acts of Joseph, as president of Lanzit, the
continuing course of conduct followed by the defendants through their
president, the lack of majority control, and the denial to plaintiffs of
their corporate rights and privileges, exhibit oppression in this particular
situation."116 Those findings were based, in part, upon
a continuing course of oppressive conduct for which the future holds
little or no hope of abatement. A continuing course of refusal of the
controlling group to agree with the plaintiffs on any issue is
evidenced. Moreover, Joseph has acted in an arbitrary and highhanded manner as president of the corporation-refusing to follow the
dictates or direction of the corporate bylaws, or to subordinate
his
117
actions to the advice or control of the board of directors.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 136.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 136-37.
See id. at137.
Id.
Id.at 138.
Id.
Id.
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The supreme court therefore affirmed the decree dissolving the
1 18
corporation.
Although Gidwitz may appear to be a ringing vindication of
oppression theory as a prophylactic against overbearing conduct by
those in control of a corporation, that case's underlying allegations and
findings are not about a distinct claim of oppression. Rather, the court
uses the term oppression to describe the "cumulative effects of...
many acts and incidents, and their indicated continuing nature."'1 19 The
essential point is that those underlying "acts and incidents" were
independently either violations of Joseph's fiduciary duties or of the
BCA. 120 For example, the BCA requires that the corporation hold
annual shareholder meetings, but Lanzit held none.12 1 Certain powers
granted to the board, such as appointing officers and granting proxies to
vote shares in a subsidiary corporation, 122 were usurped. 123 Joseph's
unilateral decisions to organize another company with Lanzit funds and
to cause Lanzit to accept loans from which he profited are fairly
24
egregious examples of fiduciary duty violations.1
Despite Joseph's obvious violations of the statute and his duties as a
fiduciary, the Gidwitz court seemed to see the need for a unifying factor
tying those acts together before dissolving the corporation. 125 That
came in the form of oppression, which the court recognized as the
"cumulative effects of [the defendant's wrongful acts], and their
indicated continuing nature ...."126 Gidwitz stands for the proposition
that the court's natural reluctance to impose the "drastic remedy"' 127 of
dissolution would not be overcome by isolated, albeit numerous,
incidents of illegal or improper behavior.128 Only a continuing course

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.05 (2000); Gidwitz, 170 N.E.2d at 136.
122. See Gidwitz, 170 N.E.2d at 136 (stating that "the principles governing ... corporate
structures must apply to this corporation ....
");see also ILL. REV. STAT. 32, § 157.43 (1955)
("All officers of the corporation... shall have such authority and perform such duties.., as may
be provided in the by-laws ....
")(current version at 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.50 (2000)).
123. Gidwitz, 170 N.E.2d at 137-38.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 138 ("The cumulative effects of these many acts ... entitle plaintiffs to...
dissolution.").
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Cent. Standard 11,141 N.E.2d 45, 51 (Ill. 1957) (stating that "corporate
dissolution is a drastic remedy ....
").
128. Gidwitz, 170 N.E.2d at 138.
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of wrongful behavior would justify such an extreme remedy as
dissolution. 129
In Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Building Corp.,130 the First District
Appellate Court provided another example of the courts' disinclination
to grant the "drastic" liquidation remedy and illustrated the limited role
of oppression in its first stage of development.131 Polikoff addressed the
complaint of a minority stockholder of the Dole & Clark Building
Corporation ("Dole & Clark") that the majority stockholder (who was
also the president and a creditor of the corporation) was running 32the
business more for his benefit than for the benefit of the stockholders. 1
Members of the family of defendant Paul A. Grundman
("Grundman") owned about fifty-five percent of Dole & Clark's Class
A common stock and seventy-six percent of the Class B common
stock. 133 The plaintiff owned less than two percent of each class of
It appears that Grundman completely controlled the
stock. 134
corporation as the president and a director. 135 Grundman's son-in-law
was the corporate secretary and a director, and his daughter filled the
third directorship. 136 Grundman received a salary of $6,000 per year,
which the plaintiff asserted was "grossly excessive in view of the
financial condition of the corporation" and Grundman's less than
overwhelming workload. 137
Dole & Clark's principal asset was a building that housed a movie
theater, nine stores and a small hotel.138 The theater had been vacant for
some time and produced no revenue. 139 The hotel rooms were only
129. Id.
130. Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 184 N.E.2d 792 (I11.App. Ct. 1962).
131. Id. at 795-96.
132. Id. at 793-94.
133. Id. at 793.
134. Id. The court explained the capital structure of the corporation in some detail because it
provides an important context for the plaintiff's allegations. Id. Dole & Clark was formed in
1933 as a result of a plan of reorganization. Id. The holders of bonds before the reorganization
received Class A common stock and the former equity owners received Class B common stock.
Id. The Class A stock was entitled to no dividends, but was to be paid $100 per share upon
liquidation of the corporation or retirement of the stock. Id. The former Class B stock was
entitled to no dividends while any Class A stock remained outstanding. Id. Thus, the
bondholders who received the Class A stock retained a liquidation preference after the
reorganization. Id.
135. See id. at 794 ("During the years in question, (1952-1958), defendant Grundman was
president, a director and manager of the property ... .
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 793.
139. Id. at 794.
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about half rented and the plaintiff asserted that too little was spent on
hotel advertising. 140 At a time when Dole & Clark had suffered several
years of operating losses, Grundman's wife made a $60,000 loan to the
corporation secured by a mortgage on the real estate. 4 1 Dole & Clark
used the proceeds of the loan to improve the building even though it
was uncertain whether the mortgage principal could
be repaid, resulting
142
in foreclosure and financial gain to the Grundmans.
The plaintiff sought liquidation of the corporation, alleging that
Grundman's management of the business (particularly his refusal to sell
the building or reopen the theater) was oppressive and constituted a
waste or misapplication of corporate assets. 143 The plaintiff also
asserted that there was no reasonable prospect for the profitable
operation of the business, particularly in light of mortgage payments to
Grundman's wife. 144 The minority shareholder's primary complaint
was that due to Grundman's management, the corporation's surplus
funds to retire the Class A shares-which, according to the plaintiff was
the "principal object for which [the corporation] was formed"-were
being depleted. 145 The plaintiff also objected that Grundman's position
as a creditor of the corporation (through his wife's mortgage) placed
146
him in a position of conflict.
The trial court dismissed the action for failure to allege facts
constituting illegal, oppressive or fraudulent conduct by those in control
of the corporation or the waste or misapplication of assets, and the
plaintiff appealed this decision. 147 The appellate court began its
analysis of the plaintiff's claims with the basic proposition that "'the
majority of [the corporation's] stockholders shall control the policy of
the corporation, and regulate and govern the lawful exercise of its
franchise and business."' 148 As if that beginning were not bad enough
news for the plaintiff, the court also noted that "the remedy of
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 794-95. Plaintiffs alleged the following oppressive or wasteful actions: (1)
Grundman refused to have the corporation operate the vacant theater; (2) Grundman refused to
permit the corporation to sell the real estate contrary to the plaintiff's wishes; (3) Grundman and
his family bought additional Dole & Clark stock at depressed prices; (4) Grundman refused to
follow the plaintiffs' suggestions in managing the corporation; and (5) Grundman spent corporate
funds to pay attorneys' fees to oppose the plaintiffs suit. See id. at 794.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 793.
148. Id. at 795 (quoting Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 32 N.E. 420, 423 (I11.1892)).
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liquidation is so drastic that it must be invoked with extreme
caution." 14 9 Significantly, the court also warned that remedies for
oppression should be limited by concern for the principle of majority
rule: "The ends of justice would not be served by too broad an
application of the statute, for that would merely eliminate one evil by
substituting a greater one-oppression of the majority by the
minority." 150
In contrast to Gidwitz-the only previous case where dissolution was
orderedl 5 1-the Polikoff court found that virtually "all aspects of
plaintiff's charges relate solely to business decision-making which by
our statute is made the responsibility of the board of directors and the
officers of a corporation."' 152 Because the matters complained of were
within the statutory purview of the directors and management, "the acts
charged to Grundman are merely the exercise of business judgment
which cannot be made subject to the attack of disgruntled minority
shareholders without destroying the practicality of the corporate
form." 1 53 Thus, the court concluded that most of the plaintiff's
blunted by the principle of
complaints about Grundman's conduct were 54
majority rule and the business judgment rule. 1
In seeming contrast to previous and subsequent case law regarding a
fiduciary's divided loyalties, the court also brushed off the plaintiff's
allegations regarding Grundman's possible conflict of interest based
upon his wife's mortgage, observing that "[e]very corporate director or
officer is in a position to betray his position of trust from the moment of
155
his election."'
Finally, the court was not impressed with the argument that Dole &
Clark should be dissolved for the reason that "there is no reasonable
expectation of profitable operation."' 56 Relying upon the standard set
forth in Central Standard,the Polikoff court found that "'[t]ime may
show that there is no reasonable prospect of profitable operation. The

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 94-129 and accompanying text (discussing Gidwitz).
152. Polikoff, 184 N.E.2d at 796.
153. Id. This appears to be the first application in Illinois case law of the business judgment
rule to protect officers and directors from an attack based upon allegedly oppressive conduct.
154. Id. (citing Bixler v. Summerfield, 62 N.E. 849, 850-51 (Ill. 1902)).
155. Id. In its haste to dispose of the case, the court seemed to ignore that the operative
allegation was not that the fiduciary was "in a position" to violate his trust, but that by adopting
the dual role as director and creditor he had actually done so.
156. Id.
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present record does not."'' 15 7 Finding no basis for the liquidation of the
corporation, the Polikoff court affirmed the dismissal of the
58
complaint. 1
In Polikoff, as in Central Standard, a pure oppression claim did the
plaintiff no good. 159 The plaintiff attempted to raise at least one specific
claim of wrongdoing arising from the defendant's alleged self-dealing
in connection with the mortgage.' 6° The court's fairly cavalier
treatment of that issue seems to have been based upon a lack of
evidence of actual wrongdoing. 161 Thus, there was nothing left but a
62
naked allegation of oppression. 1
From a broader perspective, the Polikoff plaintiff seemed to be
alleging that Grundman's actions endangered her expectation that her
Class A shares would be retired promptly, which she described as "the
principal object for which [the corporation] was formed."' 163 The
plaintiff's argument was ahead of its time. As discussed below, that
sort of expectation-based view of oppression may have carried more
weight a couple of decades later. 16' Unfortunately for that plaintiff,
however, the court was not prepared to adopt that analysis in 1962.165
The First District Appellate Court's next reported opinion in a
shareholder oppression case came eight years later, with Ross v. 311
North Central Avenue Building Corp.1 66 In Ross, the complaining
shareholder obtained a remedy-but again, not on the ground of
oppression. 167 Ross was a class action brought by minority shareholders

157. Id. (quoting Cent. Standard H, 141 N.E.2d 45, 51 (Ill.
1957)).
158. Id. Presiding Justice Burman dissented from the opinion of the court, finding grounds for
possible liquidation. Id. at 797 (Burman, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent validated the
plaintiff's basic argument that Grundman was using his position of trust to employ corporate
funds to protect the security for his wife's mortgage, rather than for the benefit of the corporation
and its stockholders. Id. (Burman, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Burman believed that the
facts substantiated the claims that there was no reasonable likelihood of profitable operation. Id.
(Burman, J., dissenting). He particularly feared that adopting the defendants' arguments in light
of the supreme court's holding in Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co. might be read as
precedent that a liquidation remedy would be unreasonably restricted, being granted only in the
event of a deadlock. See id. (Burman, J., dissenting).
159. See supra notes 66-93 and accompanying text (discussing Cent. Standard II).
160. Polikoff, 184 N.E.2d at 794.
161. Id. at 795.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the "reasonable expectations" model of oppression).
165. See infra notes 383-415 (discussing the 1992 case that first gave real weight to
shareholders' reasonable expectations).
166. Ross v. 311 N. Cent. Ave. Bldg. Corp., 264 N.E.2d 406 (111. App. Ct. 1970).
167. Id. at 415.
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of the 311 North Central Avenue Building Corp. ("Building Corp."),
which owned and operated an apartment hotel. 168 The plaintiff class
owned about thirty-four percent of Building Corp.'s outstanding
stock. 169 The defendants were the corporation and members of the
Nikolas family, owners of about sixty-four percent of Building Corp.'s
stock. 170 Three members of the Nikolas family constituted the board of
directors and officers of the corporation. 171
The plaintiffs alleged that the Nikolas defendants withdrew over
$48,000 from Building Corp., which the defendants asserted was loaned
to a corporation of which the Nikolas family were the owners, officers
and directors, and which was secured by a second mortgage on real
estate. 172 It appears that the non-controlling shareholders of Building
Corp. were not advised of the purported loan until about a year later,
when the annual report showed an entry for a second mortgage as an
investment of the corporation, but did not disclose that the loan was
made to a corporation affiliated with the Nikolas family. 173 When one
of the plaintiffs asked the president of Building Corp. about the second
mortgage item, the president stated, "'I can do anything I see fit with
74
this money."" 1
The plaintiffs filed suit immediately upon discovering the identity 1of
75
the recipient of the funds, seeking the dissolution of Building Corp.
The defendants returned the money to Building Corp. nine days after
being served with summons, and the court somewhat incredulously
related the defendants' position that they had received the funds by
selling "the alleged second mortgage at par."' 176 After repayment, the
funds were held in reserve by the corporation and were not distributed
177
to the shareholders.
It is fairly clear that the trial court concluded that the controlling
shareholders essentially attempted to steal $43,000 from the Building
Corp. 178 The court found that there was no evidence that the supposed

168. Id. at 408.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 408-09.
173. Id. at 411 (quoting the defendant George Nikolas, IH).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 409.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. "The plaintiffs have rendered a beneficial service to all the shareholders of the
corporation in filing the suit and procuring a refund of the funds improperly diverted by the
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second mortgage had been executed. 179 The court further found that the
funds returned to the corporation should have been distributed to the
shareholders because "the funds were not needed for corporate
purposes" in light of the directors' demonstrated willingness to "freeze
180
[those funds in] the loan for a twenty year period."
The trial court held that the "conduct of the defendants was
oppressive,"'' s the purported loan itself was a fraud upon the minority
shareholders, and the false representation of a second mortgage was also
fraudulent. 182 The trial court removed the defendants from the
management of the corporation and ordered liquidation of the
83
corporation.'
The appellate court upheld the trial court's findings of fraudulent and
oppressive acts and found that the trial court properly ordered
dissolution of the corporation. 184 The appellate court also rejected the
defendants' argument that there was no harm because the funds were
repaid to the corporation, stating that the "central issue concerning the
transaction in question was whether defendants' conduct was a fraud as
to the corporation and its minority stockholders."'' 8 5 The issue of
defendants' fraud could not be "cured" merely by the repayment of
186
funds to the corporation after the defendants' fraud was uncovered.
Moreover, the court emphasized that no loss is necessary to sustain an
187
order dissolving the corporation for oppression.
It is easy to see that the wrongdoing of the Nikolas family, as framed
by the Ross court, is best understood as fraud and self-dealing, not
oppression. Perhaps the court believed that adding oppression to the
mix-particularly in light of the return of the money-gave it solid
footing to support the dissolution remedy, following the lead of the
supreme court in Gidwitz. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that
the controlling shareholders' naked theft of corporate funds for their
defendants, and are entitled to compensation for attorney's fees and other services and expenses."
Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 410. The court did not specify in what ways the defendants' conduct was
"oppressive" or how the finding of oppression differed from the finding of fraud.
182. Id. at 409.
183. Id. at410.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 412.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 413. The court stated, "'[i]t is not necessary that fraud, illegality or even loss be
shown to exhibit oppression of plaintiffs and their interest in the corporation."' Id. (quoting
Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (11. 1960)).
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own purposes, even though the money was later returned, would not
have been enough by itself to justify dissolution of the corporation
under the rubric of fraud or illegality.
The Fifth District Appellate Court's opinion in Compton v. Paul K.
Harding Realty Co. 188 is one of the most broadly-worded and oftencited oppression cases in Illinois. Paul K. Harding Realty Co.
("Realty") was a closely-held corporation formed by defendant Paul K.
Harding ("Harding"), plaintiff Martha Compton, and Compton's
brother, plaintiff Forrest Leoty. 189 Although the court's opinion does
not specify the ownership interest of each shareholder, it appears that
Harding held a majority of the stock in exchange for an $8,500
investment, while Compton and Leoty together invested $7,650.'90
Harding was president and manager of Realty, and Compton was
executive vice-president and treasurer. 191
All three shareholders signed a shareholder agreement which
provided that the president was to be the "operating head" of Realty and
"have the authority to set salaries ... and do things which normally are
the responsibility of the operating head of the company."' 92 It also
provided that the salary of the operating manager was to be set at $100
per week, and193increased to $175 per week when the business began to
make a profit.
The court observed that the "internal affairs of the corporation were
badly managed and loosely attended" from the start. 194 Among other
things, "salaries, commissions and appraisal fees of the officers were
without a discernable pattern or plan,"'195 and, notwithstanding the
shareholders' agreement, Harding's salary as president of the
corporation started at $175 per week, increased to $200 per week a few
to $250 per week without any formal
months later and eventually rose
96
shareholder or board approval. 1
The plaintiffs essentially alleged that Harding ran the corporation as a
one-man show, engaging in mismanagement, self-dealing, waste of

188. Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574 (I11.App. Ct. 1972).
189. Id. at 576-77.
190. Id. at 577-78.
191. Id. at 577.
192. Id. at 576-77.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 577.
195. Id.
196. Id.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

corporate assets, fraud and breach of contract along the way. 197 They
19 8
sought the appointment of a receiver and the dissolution of Realty.
After trial, the court found that Harding had been paid a salary that was
over $29,000 in excess of the amount to which he was entitled under the
shareholder agreement, but that he had committed no fraud. 199 The
court also ordered that the corporation be dissolved and the proceeds
distributed to the shareholders based upon a formula 2intended to
compensate plaintiffs for the excessive payments to Harding. 00
Harding appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in upholding the
contract entered into by the parties. 20 1 The appellate court affirmed the
trial court and upheld the agreement, noting that shareholder agreements
had long been upheld by Illinois courts even though those agreements
"may be in some respects in technical violation of the Business
202
Corporation Act.-

The defendant further asserted that, because the trial court found that
Harding had not committed fraud and "there was no evidence of
injustice or impropriety upon their part," the court erred in ordering
dissolution. 20 3 The court cited the familiar admonition of the supreme
court in Central Standard that no evidence of fraud or illegality is
required to support a finding of oppression. 204 Oppression, the court
held, could be found in "an arbitrary, overbearing and heavy-handed
20 5
course of conduct.
The court cited the following specific conduct constituting
oppression: (1) Harding's failure to call board meetings or consult with
the plaintiffs on management issues, (2) his "imperious" attitude in
answering questions about his salary, and (3) his delay in responding to
2 6
requests for information. 0

197. Id. The following constitute Harding's alleged wrongdoing: (1) no meeting of
shareholders or directors was ever held; (2) the operation and policies of Realty were controlled
and directed by Harding without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs; (3) Harding caused
the corporation to pay him some $16,000 in excessive salary. Id. at 579, 581.
198. Id. at 577.
199. Id. at 578.
200. Id. Based upon the appellate court's explication of the trial court's liquidation formula, it
appears that the amounts to be distributed to shareholders equals 106.25% of the total liquidation
proceeds. See id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (quoting Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Il1. 1964)).
203. Id. at 581.
204. Id. (citing Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131 (I11. 1960); Cent.
StandardI1, 141 N.E.2d 45 (Ill. 1957)).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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The appellate court upheld the order of dissolution, but modified the
judgment to provide that the shareholders' agreement should govern the
20 7
distribution of the corporation's assets on liquidation.
Notwithstanding the court's references to oppression as a particular
wrong, Compton, like Gidwitz and Ross, is another example of courts
using oppression as the icing on the cake to support a dissolution
remedy. Although the court did not find that Harding committed fraud,
his various acts in derogation of the corporate form were at least in
20 8
violation of the BCA.
The reference to oppression demonstrated that the defendant's
wrongdoing was not so much his failure to abide by the BCA, but his
underlying intention to exclude the plaintiffs. With or without the
oppression gloss, the plaintiffs essentially pointed out to the court that
the defendant had acted routinely as if the corporation did not exist. 2°9
The court took the logical next step by dissolving the corporation,
thereby freeing the plaintiffs' capital.
Compton may be viewed as the last of the cases decided under the
first stage of oppression development in which oppression was used not
as an independent wrong, but as a unifying principle in the analysis of
other wrongs, such as fraud, illegality, and breach of duty. Opinions in
the first stage are notable for very broad, but vague, language. That
2 10
type of rhetoric is still cited in courts' discussions of oppressions.
However, the "definitions" of oppression crafted by courts in those
cases, especially Central Standardand Gidwitz, must be understood in
their context. While hardly exemplars of clarity and precision, the
vague oppression definition offered up in those cases might have
sufficed if limited to its initial purpose as a unifying principle. But
oppression eventually grew beyond that limited role, taking on a more
substantive meaning. That development raises serious questions about
the wisdom of maintaining definitions of oppression that were created
and intended for a different, and much more limited, application.
2. Second Stage-Oppression as a Breach of Duty
By the time the Third District Appellate Court decided Notzke v. Art
Gallery, Inc. 211 in 1980, oppression began to take on a more
substantive, although still not sharply defined, role as an independent
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 582.
Id.
See id.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
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wrong committed by the controlling shareholder. In that second phase
of oppression development, courts began to treat oppression as the
violation of duties owed by the controlling shareholder. However,
where courts explained that certain factors gave rise to a finding of
oppression, one never really knows whether the behavior at issue would
have been deemed oppressive had one or more factors been absent or if
some other factors had been present. Thus, it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that during the second stage of development, oppression was
very much like pornography-the courts did little to define it, but
2 12
claimed to know it when they saw it.
The first of the second stage cases, Notzke, centered upon a dispute
over The Art Gallery, Inc. ("Art Gallery"), which was formed by the
plaintiff, Gerald Notzke, and defendants Richard Lewis and Ronald
Hild, each investing $15,000 and each receiving 2000 shares in
return. 2 13 The board of directors was composed of the three
214
shareholders, and Notzke was elected president.
Art Gallery was formed to build and operate a cocktail lounge in
Peoria, and the corporation borrowed some $52,000 for that purpose.2 15
Neither of the defendants had any experience in the construction or
operation of a cocktail lounge. 216 Notzke, the plaintiff, designed the
lounge and supervised its construction with Hild's assistance. 217 Lewis
and Hild were pleased with Notzke's work, and the board of directors
adopted a resolution to pay Notzke $5,000 at some time in the future.21 8
Art Gallery operated for a few months under the management of
219
Notzke and Hild until they began to have business disagreements.
Eventually, the shareholders agreed that Notzke would leave his outside
employment and become the full-time manager of the lounge, while
Hild would have no ongoing management responsibility. 220
The
plaintiff asserted that the other shareholders had promised him the
'
managerial job "as long as he was effective in that capacity. "221

212. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (discussing the
challenge faced by the Court in trying to "define the indefinable" of pornography in First and
Fourteenth Amendment cases).
213. Notzke, 405 N.E.2d at 840.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 840-41.
221. Id. at 841.
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Apparently, the relations between the owners continued to deteriorate
until Lewis and Hild eventually informed the plaintiff that they wanted
to sell their interests in the Art Gallery. 222 Lewis asked $20,000 for his
shares, and Hild wanted $30,000.223 The plaintiff offered to purchase
Lewis' shares for about $18,000 and stated that he would buy out either
shareholder, but could not afford to purchase from both at the same
time.224
Lewis agreed to sell his shares to Hild for $30,000 payable in sixty
monthly installments of $622.225 The plaintiff was not offered a similar
installment payment plan by either shareholder. 226 After Hild and
Lewis reached an agreement for the stock sale, Hild and Notzke dealt
with each other as the only two shareholders-with Hild holding twothirds of the stock and Notzke holding the remaining third.22 7
In December of 1975, the plaintiff wrote two corporate checks to
himself totaling $4,900 (an amount close to the $5,000 bonus that he
was promised, but never received).2 28 When Hild received news of the
checks, he was not moved by the spirit of the season but promptly
stopped payment and removed the corporate records from the business
premises. 229 In light of those developments, the shareholders
determined that the plaintiff would manage the lounge, but that Hild
would have sole power to disburse funds, hire and fire employees and
230
generally manage the company.
Early in 1976, Hild alleged that Notzke tried to make up for the loss
of his "Christmas bonus" by taking cash from the register during his
shift tending bar. 231 According to Hild, Notzke admitted to the theft,
and Hild fired him and banned him from the lounge. 23 2 Notzke,
however, denied the theft and asserted that Hild told him that they "just
233
couldn't see eye-to-eye" and that Hild "no longer needed" Notzke.
After firing Notzke, Hild took over as manager of the lounge for a

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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salary of $500 per week.2 34 The court noted that, without his salary as
club manager, Hild would have been unable to make the payments of
$622 per month owed to Lewis for the stock purchase.23 5
Notzke sued Hild, Lewis and Art Gallery seeking specific
performance of a restrictive buy-sell agreement, damages from the
breach of that agreement, damages from the breach of an oral
employment agreement and liquidation of the corporation pursuant to
the BCA.23 6 The plaintiff's central allegation was that the defendants
conspired together and that the plaintiff was "deprived of his position in
the corporation, his share of corporate control, and his managerial
employment as a result of this conspiratorial course of conduct.
237
Plaintiff contends this represents oppressiveness under the statute."
After a bench trial, the court ordered that the defendants purchase the
plaintiff's Art Gallery shares within three months for a payment equal to
one-third of the corporation's net worth. 23 8 After the defendants failed
to do so, the court ordered that the corporation be liquidated.23 9
The appellate court began its legal analysis with reference to the
24
broad definition of oppressive conduct set forth in Gidwitz. 0
However, the court also noted that, while the "concept of
oppressiveness as a ground for corporate liquidation has been available
to shareholders since 1933 ... neither the litigants nor our research have
'
revealed an authoritative determination of its precise scope. "241
The court attached particular significance to a string of suspicious
coincidences. First, within three months after Notzke became manager
on a full-time basis, Lewis and Hild both wanted to sell their shares but
offered them to the plaintiff on terms which made acquisition by the
plaintiff impossible. 242 Second, shortly thereafter, it appears that Lewis
agreed to sell his shares to Hild on much more favorable terms. 243
Third, Hild fired Notzke and took over as manager at a salary of $2,000

234. Id. at 842.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 840.
237. Id. at 842.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 843 (citing Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ill.
1960)).
241. Id. (citation omitted). The court then briefly reviewed most of the prior Illinois cases on
the topic of oppression, with the exception of Polikoff v. Dole & Clark, 184 N.E.2d 792 (Il. App.
Ct. 1962). Notzke, 405 N.E.2d at 843.
242. Id. at 843-44.
243. Id. at 844.
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per month (up from the $1,600 per month previously paid to plaintiff for
the same job) shortly after he became obligated to pay Lewis $622 per
month for his stock.244
The court considered those events to be more than mere
coincidences:
Considering the parameters of oppressiveness established in our
decisional law, we feel the complaint at bar alleged a course 245
of
conduct which was "overbearing and heavy handed.,
Conspiratorial action allegedly affecting an individual shareholder's
control over corporate matters and the effective operation and
profitability of the venture, coupled with alleged irregularity in the
equity transfer meet the threshold of objectionable
oppressiveness
246
addressed by the statute and case law thereunder.
The court also seemed to be particularly concerned that Hild continued
to maintain the theft even though no criminal charges were ever brought
against the plaintiff.247

The court suggested that Hild's allegation of

theft was a mere pretext for firing Notzke as part of the defendants'
"conspiratorial ploy." 24 8
The court then looked to the nature of the defendants' conduct to
249
determine whether corporate liquidation was an appropriate remedy.
The court stated, "[w]here, as here, a director and officer of a
corporation has accused another director of dishonesty and continues to
act on the premise that the accusation is true, not only is such conduct
oppressive, it also permeates all of the business relations between the
parties." 250 The appellate court upheld liquidation as an appropriate
1
remedy.

25

Notzke can be read as perhaps the first reported Illinois opinion to
base dissolution solely upon a finding of oppression. However, the
facts do not support a conclusion that there was oppression, at least not
as the term was previously used in Illinois law. Although the court's
rhetoric is pure oppression, it appears that the court's real concern

244. Id. The implication of the court's juxtaposition of those events, of course, is that Lewis
and Hild conspired to eliminate Notzke so that Lewis could be bought out of his stock position
with the company's money and effectively at no cost to Hild.
245. Id. at 843. The court here appears to be referring to Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty
Co., 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1972).
246.

Notzke, 405 N.E.2d at 842.

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 844.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

410

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

centered upon breaches of duty by the two defendant shareholders.
Thus, the court used oppression to mean a failure of substantive and
252
procedural fairness in dealings between the shareholders.
That reading explains the court's focus on the "conspiratorial ploy,"
by which one defendant shareholder sold out, the other defendant
shareholder was able to fund the buy-out by receiving corporate funds
and the plaintiff shareholder was left out in the cold. Regardless of the
actual thought process behind the court's ruling, it cannot be said that
the plaintiff would have been without a remedy in the absence of
oppression theory. Even in Notzke-where oppression was the only
articulated basis for dissolution-it appears that the same result would
have been achieved, perhaps on a more defensible basis, under a
fiduciary duty analysis.
The next appellate decision in Illinois addressing oppression was
Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc.253 As with Notzke, the
Romanik court appeared to treat oppression as a substantive wrong but,
unlike Notzke, awarded the minority no relief. In Romanik, the minority
shareholders of Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc. ("Lurie") sued the
corporation and several members of the family of Peter Lurie, who was
254
the deceased former president and controlling shareholder of Lurie.
Named as defendants were Peter's widow and executor of his estate,
Edna Lurie, and Ronald Lurie, who was Peter's son as well as a
corporate director and Lurie's legal counsel. 5
The plaintiffs challenged both Peter's purchase, from a third party, of
the building and land where Lurie's store was located, and an increase
in rent to be paid to Peter by Lurie for use of the property.2 5 6 They also
objected to Peter's new employment agreement, which provided a
substantial increase in salary and death benefits.2 5 7 Subsequently, the
plaintiffs added allegations regarding a consulting agreement and
preferred stock that was issued for Peter's benefit.2 5 8 Peter died during
the pendency of the case.2 5 9 Thereafter, Lurie granted a death benefit to
Edna. 260 It also made three separate short-term loans to the Peter Lurie
Revocable Trust ("Trust"), totaling nearly $71,000, to pay Peter's estate
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See id.
Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Ctr., Inc., 435 N.E.2d 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id.
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taxes. 26' The last two payments were made while the first was past
due. 262 The plaintiffs also challenged the death benefit and those
loans.

26 3

After the trial, the court granted partial relief by voiding the issuance
of preferred stock, the three loans made by Lurie to the Trust and the
death benefit paid to Edna. 264 The plaintiffs appealed to the appellate
court, seeking full relief, while defendants cross-appealed seeking
reversal of the judgment or a new trial.26 5
Regarding the plaintiffs' claim that Peter breached his fiduciary duty
as an officer and director by entering into the employment agreement
with Lurie, the court noted that, because Peter was a director, officer
and controlling shareholder of the corporation when the agreement was
established, the defendants bore the burden of showing the
reasonableness of the employment agreement. 266 The court found that
the employment agreement was reasonable, except that the deferred
267
compensation provision was reduced from ten to five years.
With regard to the lease transaction, the court stated the well
established rule that "[w]here a director or officer transacts business
with the corporation, the duty of undivided loyalty requires that the
transaction be fair and places the burden of demonstrating fairness on
the director or officer." 268 The appellate court found that the defendants
failed to demonstrate the fairness of the lease transaction. 269 The court
determined that the value of the property had declined by almost
seventy percent in the six years after Peter purchased it, but he
nevertheless charged Lurie an annual rental equal to nearly ninety
percent of the total value of the property. 270 The effect of the lease
agreement, according to the court, was to permit Peter to improperly
27 1
shift the burden of his bad investment onto Lurie.
The court of appeals also held that the preferred shares should not
have been issued because they related to a payment due after Peter
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 716-17.
265. Id. at 717.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 718-19.
268. Id. (citing Shlensky v. S. Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793 (Il. 1960)).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 720.
271. Id. The court directed that the trial court on remand should determine the fair rental rate
and order return of the excess rental payments to the corporation. Id. at 720-21.
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retired.27 2 In fact, Peter never signed the consulting agreement and
never retired (having died before he could retire) and, therefore, the
273
court ordered that the shares be returned to Lurie.
The plaintiffs also prevailed on their claim that the directors breached
their duties by approving the three loans to the Trust. 274 On appeal, the
defendants contended that the loans were proper interest-bearing
investments within the discretion of the board, but the court found that
two of the loans were issued at below-market rates.275 Moreover, even
though the first loan was overdue when the subsequent loans were
276
issued, Lurie did not require any security for the subsequent loans.
Because the favorable terms benefited the controlling shareholder at the
expense of the corporation, the court found that the directors breached
their duties and ordered that two of the three loans be repaid at the then
277
prevailing interest rate.
In its first explicit discussion of oppression, the appellate court turned
to the plaintiffs' allegation that the $5,000 death benefit paid to Peter's
widow as authorized by Peter's sons was "further evidence of
defendants' 'oppressive tactics' and was not required by the
employment agreement." 278 It is not clear what additional evidence of
supposed oppressive tactics had been offered.
The court noted that "corporate directors commonly authorize
benefits to widows that are not required by the employment contract"
and that such payments should be sustained if "reasonable in amount,
and the directors have exercised an honest and reasonable business
judgment in granting them." 279 The court found that the amount of the
payment was clearly reasonable and that, even though granted by the
recipient's sons, there was no evidence that the payment was part of an
"oppressive scheme" or that the directors did not exercise "honest and
28 0
reasonable business judgment in authorizing payment."
The plaintiffs also alleged that the failure to declare dividends was
oppressive. 28 1 Initially, the court noted that the "decision concerning
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 721.
Id.
Id. at 722.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 723.
Id. at 721.

279. Id. at 721-22 (citing F.
CORPORATIONS ch. 8, at 118 (1971)).

280. Id. at 722.
281. Id. at 723.
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the declaration of a dividend where a legal dividend fund is available
rests solely within the sole discretion of the board of directors. Courts
are reluctant to interfere with the exercise of the directors' business
judgment unless the withholding is fraudulent, oppressive or totally
without merit." 282 The court then described the plaintiffs' practical
problem. They could hardly be heard to complain that no dividends had
been declared since Peter became the seventy-five percent shareholder,
because in fact no dividends had ever been paid.2 83 Because the
defendants were able to offer legitimate business reasons for the failure
to pay dividends, the court upheld the trial 284court's ruling that the
directors properly determined to retain earnings.
As noted above, Romanik does not involve any remedies for
oppression. 285 To the extent that the plaintiff received relief, it was on
grounds other than oppression. The court, however, found for the
defendants regarding corporate actions challenged purely on the basis of
286
oppression.
The modern low-water mark for oppression theory came as a result of
two cases decided by the First District Appellate Court. The first, Jaffe
Commercial Financial Co. v. Harris,287 was decided in 1983. The
second, Coduti v. Hellwig,288 was decided in 1984. In the first, Jaffe
Commercial Finance. Co. v. Harris, the court addressed the alleged
freeze-out of a minority shareholder of defendant Harris Loan and
Mortgage Co. ("Harris Loan"). 289 The shareholders of Harris Loan
were Joel Salk ("Salk"), who controlled one-third of the stock,290 and
defendants Paul Harris ("Paul") and his brother Ruben Harris
("Ruben"), who together owned two-thirds of the stock. 29' Each of the
292
three shareholders was elected a director and re-elected annually.
Paul was president of Harris Loan, Ruben was vice president and
App. 89 (1934)).
282. Id. (citing Hofeller v. Gen. Candy Corp., 275 I11.
283. Id.
284. Id. The board's reasons for retaining earnings included keeping funds available for the
anticipated "purchase of a warehouse, the expansion of inventory and the possibility that the
company might have to finance its own inventory." Id.
285. See supra notes 253-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Romanik case).
286. Romanik, 435 N.E.2d at 722-23.
App. Ct. 1983).
287. Jaffe Commercial Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224 (I11.
App. Ct. 1984), overruled by Schirmer v. Bear,
288. Coduti v. Hellwig, 469 N.E.2d 220 (I11.
672 N.E.2d 1170 (111. 1996).
289. Jaffe Commercial Fin. Co., 456 N.E.2d at 226.
290. Id. Salk's interests were held in the name of the plaintiff, Jaffe Commercial Finance Co.
("Jaffe"). Id.
291. Id. at 226-27.
292. Id. at 227.
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treasurer, and Salk was secretary. 293 The Harrises conducted the daily
operations of the business and each received a salary. 294 Salk was paid
295
as a consultant.
At the time Harris Loan was formed, the shareholders entered into a
shareholders' agreement which prohibited a shareholder from selling his
stock to an outsider without first offering the stock to the corporation
and the other shareholders at book value. 296 There was no discussion of
297
paying stock dividends.
After several years of profitable operation, a disagreement arose
between the Harris brothers and Salk. 298 As a result of the dispute, Salk
advised the Harrises that he wished to sell his interests in Harris Loan
stock and demanded $300,000.299 Pursuant to the buy-sell agreement,
the Harrises offered to purchase Salk's interests for book value,
amounting to $35,000. 300 After Salk threatened the Harrises with a
lawsuit, which he claimed would have a chilling effect on their lines of
credit, the Harrises terminated Salk's consulting agreement and
30 1
removed him as corporate secretary and director.
Salk sued, claiming that the Harrises had engaged in oppression by
freezing Salk out of the business. 30 2 He sought to enforce an alleged
"actual agreement between the Harris brothers and Salk, by course of
conduct and oral agreement" that each shareholder would have a seat on
the board of directors. 30 3 Under the alleged agreement, Salk would
serve as corporate secretary; each shareholder would invest equally in
the enterprise; and each shareholder would "receive income from the
company in accordance with an agreed-upon formula" so that each
would receive an equal return on his investment, except that the Harris
brothers would be compensated for managing the business; and Salk
30 4
would serve as a consultant.

293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 228.
296. Id. at 227.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. (citing I11.Rev. Stat. ch. 32,
303. Id. at 229.
304. Id. at 227, 229.

157.86 (1979)).
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Salk also claimed that he was entitled to the payment of dividends
from Harris Loan on the basis of past practice. 30 5 Even though Harris
Loan had not paid dividends denominated as such, Salk asserted that the
so-called consulting payments that he received from 1973 through 1977
in lieu of dividends to permit Salk and Harris Loan
were actually made
306
taxes.
dodge
to
The trial court held that the Harrises committed neither breach of
fiduciary duty nor oppression by removing Salk, but merely exercised
their rights as majority shareholders to "vote their strength. '30 7 In
addition, the court held that Salk failed to prove the alleged oral
agreement regarding the operation of Harris Loan and Salk's
participation in it. 30 8 Finally, the court found that Salk was barred from
equitable relief by his unclean hands because he had 3purportedly
9
received "dividends" disguised as sham consulting payments. 0
The appellate court upheld the lower court's finding that the plaintiff
was not entitled to relief because the evidence regarding the purported
agreement between the shareholders was "ambiguous and
contradictory." 3 10 The court noted that the existence of such an
agreement was contradicted by the facts. 3 11 Among other things, the
Harrises had a specific compensation package, while Salk did not. 312 In
addition, Salk represented himself to the IRS and otherwise as a
consultant, and he was paid as a consultant based upon bills that he
submitted.3 13
Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the Harris
brothers breached their fiduciary duties as directors and controlling
shareholders because their compensation was not reasonable. 3 14 The
court affirmed the existence of a fiduciary duty among shareholders of a
closely-held corporation by stating, "[t]he decision of joint adventurers
to form and operate as a corporation, rather than as a partnership, does
not change the fact that they embarked on a joint enterprise; thus, their
3 15
mutual duties and obligations are similar to those of partners."
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id. at 227.
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 229, 232.
Id. at 229-31.
Id. at 229.
Id.at 230.
Id.
Id. (citing Tilley v. Shippee, 147 N.E.2d 347, 352 (Il1. 1958)).
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However, the court also made clear that those duties do not supplant the
general rule of judicial deference to the lawful acts of corporate
directors. 316 Because the trial court properly found that the salaries in
question were not beyond the range of reason, there was no basis to find
that the Harris brothers breached their fiduciary duties in that regard.3 17
In addressing the plaintiff's contention that the Harris brothers
improperly excluded Salk from the management, control and income of
the corporation, 3 18 the court first quoted the expansive definition of
oppression found in Gidwitz.3 19 The court ultimately determined that
the Harrises' conduct did not constitute oppression because they merely
"voted Salk out as a director" by out-voting plaintiff's stock.32 °
The appellate court contrasted the facts of Harris with those of
Compton, 32 1 in which the controlling shareholder violated corporate law
in several respects, such as excluding the plaintiffs from any meaningful
participation in the corporation. 322 Harking back to the earliest
corporate law cases in Illinois, which established the majority rule
principle, the court specifically endorsed the trial court's holding that
the majority did no more than vote its strength.32 3
Jaffe, like Polikoff some two decades before, involved allegations of
the non-controlling shareholder's "reasonable expectations."
In
Polikoff, the plaintiff expected that her stock would be redeemed. 324 It
was not, and redemption did not appear a likely possibility, but the
plaintiff there received no relief. 325 In Jaffe, the alleged expectation
was membership on the board and receipt of distributions in some form.
Those unfulfilled expectations did not give rise to a remedy for the
minority shareholder. As explained below, 326 by the time Jaffe was
316. Id. The court stated: "'Generally, unless the majority shareholders and directors are
clearly managing the affairs of the corporation dishonestly or the compensation is so
unreasonable as to constitute "waste" or "spoliation," courts have not substituted their judgment
for that of directors."' Id. (quoting Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Ctr., Inc., 435 N.E.2d 712,
718 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 231.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 232.
321. Id. at 231.
322. See id.
323. Id. at 232. The court specifically noted that "[a] shareholder in a corporation is entitled
to participate in the management according to the amount of his stock,... [however,] the
majority, by merely voting its strength to effectively oust Salk from participation in the business
of Harris Loan, did not act oppressively." Id. (citations omitted).
324. See supra notes 145, 163 and accompanying text (discussing the Polikoff case).
325. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
326. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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decided, the reasonable expectation model of oppression theory had
taken hold in some jurisdictions, but not yet in Illinois.
About a year after Jaffe, the First District dealt with its next
oppression case in Coduti v. Hellwig,327 with results similarly
disappointing to the non-controlling shareholder. That case was
brought by a minority shareholder, James Coduti ("Coduti"), of Hudson
Tool & Die Corporation ("Hudson"),3 2 8 who sought to dissolve Hudson
and to obtain "an accounting of allegedly improper benefits received"
329
by Hudson's controlling shareholder, Werner Hellwig ("Hellwig"). 0
33
Coduti, Hellwig and Hellwig's son constituted the board of directors.
The shareholders never entered into a shareholders' agreement, even
331
though Coduti purportedly had requested one.
The working arrangement between the major shareholders was that
Hellwig served as president of Hudson and handled the administrative
duties. 3 32 Coduti also served as an officer and managed the production
facilities. 333 It appears that Coduti worked long hours at Hudson, while
Hellwig devoted substantially less time to the business and spent
significant periods away. 334 The shareholders' salaries had historically
been set without formal action by the board of directors. 335 For
example, at one point Hellwig substantially reduced his salary when he
believed that he was not fully able to perform his duties and raised it
again when he thought that he could.3 36
Coduti alleged that Hellwig conducted the business in an "arbitrary,
heavy-handed and overbearing" manner. 337 In particular, Coduti
327. Coduti v. Hellwig, 469 N.E.2d 220 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), overruled by Schirmer v. Bear,
672 N.E.2d 1171 (111. 1996).
328. Id. at 223.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 224.
332. Id. at 223.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 225. In introducing Coduti's oppression allegations, the appellate court made
particular reference to Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., for the proposition that a
controlling shareholder's actions that are "arbitrary, overbearing and heavy-handed" constitute
oppression. Id. (quoting Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (I11.App.
Ct. 1972)). Hellwig's alleged arbitrary, overbearing and heavy-handed conduct included the
following: "refusing to authorize dividends or bonuses when the corporation has large cash
reserves; refusing to allow Coduti's attorney to be present at a director's meeting; holding
director's meetings without notice to Coduti; causing Coduti to be arrested; and opening Coduti's
mail and belittling him in the presence of others." Id.
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alleged that Hellwig excluded Coduti's attorney from board meetings
and permitted checks to be issued without Coduti's signature.338 Coduti
also alleged that Hellwig breached his fiduciary duties to Hudson and
that those breaches constituted fraud. 339 The breach of duty allegations
concerned a separate Illinois corporation called Hollywood Perforators
("Hollywood"), which Hellwig and his son owned.3 4° Coduti alleged
of Hollywood's expenses as
that Hellwig caused Hudson to pay34some
1
well as Hellwig's personal expenses.
Having covered fraud and oppression, Coduti also made a stab at the
final category of conduct that may entitle a shareholder to dissolution
under the BCA-"waste and misapplication of assets." 342 Coduti
asserted, among other things, that Hellwig ran up large credit balances
his country club membership, thereby
on corporate charge cards and
343
misapplying corporate assets.
Following the trial, the lower court found all issues in favor of the
defendants, noting particularly that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
evidence of waste, mismanagement, illegality or oppression so as to
the trial court denied
warrant Hudson's dissolution. 344 Accordingly,
345
accounting.
an
including
any and all relief,
On appeal, the court examined the judicial dissolution provision of
the BCA and analyzed the holdings of several of the leading oppression
cases in Illinois. 34 6 Based upon its analysis of the case law, the court
concluded that "no single act which, by itself, will be deemed
' 347
oppressive without consideration of the surrounding circumstances."
Thus, the court determined that "each case claiming oppression as a
basis for corporate dissolution must be determined solely upon its own

338. Id. at 226.
339. Id. at 227.
340. Id. at 223.
341. Id. at 228.
342. Id. at 229.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 224.
345. Id.
1960);
346. Id. at 224-25 (citing Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131 (I11.
1957); Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 839 (I11.
Cent. Standard 11, 141 N.E.2d 45 (I11.
App. Ct. 1973); Compton v. Paul K. Harding
App. Ct. 1980); Gray v. Hall, 295 N.E.2d 506 (I11.
App. Ct. 1972); Ross v. 311 N. Cent. Ave. Bldg. Corp., 264
Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574 (I11.
App. Ct. 1970)). Probably because of its collection and synopsis of leading
N.E.2d 406 (I11.
cases, Coduti is considered by many judges to be a leading Illinois case on the topic of
shareholder oppression.
347. Id. at 225. "'[A]ctions which might be oppressive under one set of circumstances would
not be oppressive under others."' Id. (quoting Gray, 295 N.E.2d at 509).
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facts." 348 The appellate court reviewed each of Coduti's allegations of
oppressive conduct to determine whether any or all of them constituted
349
oppression in this particular context.
First, the court noted the familiar rule that courts are reluctant to
interfere with the board's discretion regarding whether to declare
dividends "'unless the withholding is fraudulent, oppressive or totally
without merit.' ' 350 The appellate court upheld the trial court's finding
that the refusal to declare dividends was not oppressive for three
reasons: (1) Coduti and his children were Hudson employees and
received large bonuses, (2) when Hellwig proposed dividends, Coduti
never suggested a larger or additional dividend, and (3) Hellwig
testified that Hudson required a large cash reserve for several apparently
35 1
legitimate purposes.
In addition, the court made short work of Coduti's assertions about
irregularities in board meetings. 352 The court stated that excluding
Coduti's attorney from a meeting of the board of directors was not
oppressive. 353 Nor was the board's decision (in Coduti's absence) to
permit checks to be issued with only Helwig's signature deemed
oppressive. 354 The court noted that Coduti's refusal to sign checks had
interfered with the company's accounts payable and payroll and that it
appeared that no check signed by Helwig alone had cleared, because
355
Coduti eventually resumed signing checks.
The court also addressed the peculiar allegation that Hellwig
committed oppression by having Coduti arrested.35 6 That episode arose
from Hellwig's decision to rescind Coduti's authority to make bids
without Hellwig's approval.35 7 Hellwig testified that his decision arose

348. Id. Although the appellate court's determination to decide every case upon its own facts
is heartening, the appellate court seemed to miss the point that those facts are going to be
examined without reference to any set standards of conduct.
349. Id. (citing Gray, 295 N.E.2d at 509).
350. Id. at 226 (quoting Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Ctr., Inc., 435 N.E.2d 712, 723 (11.
App. Ct. 1982)). The court appears to have missed the ironic circularity (of the kind which pops
up so often in oppression jurisprudence) in stating that refusal to declare dividends may be
grounds for a finding of oppression if the failure to declare dividends is oppressive.
351. See id. Coduti previously wanted the corporation to accumulate cash reserves, and
Helwig wanted it to pay out its reserves as dividends. See id. In the litigation, the parties took
directly contrary positions. See id.
352. See id. at 226-27.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 227.
356. Id.
357. Id.
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from a fifty-five percent decline in business and that he was just doing
his job as president. 358 Apparently, Coduti did not appreciate Hellwig's
views and, upon learning that his quotation authority had been revoked,
chased Hellwig into the plant waiving a piece of copper. 35 9 Or perhaps
not, because although charged with aggravated assault, Coduti was later
acquitted. 360 The appellate court determined that the conflicting
evidence required it to defer to the findings of the trial court that no
oppression was involved.36 1 The court followed the same approach
with regard to Coduti's allegation that Hellwig had "belittled" him in
the presence of outsiders and consistently opened his mail.362 Because
of conflicting testimony, the appellate court deferred to the trial363court's
finding that the allegations did not make out a case of oppression.
With regard to Coduti's charges of breach of fiduciary duty and
fraud, the court upheld the trial court's finding that there was no breach
of duty. 364 Finally, the court determined that the credit balances on
Hellwig's corporate charge cards and country club memberships were
judgment of the board of directors
matters committed to the business
365
and did not constitute illegality.
In the final analysis, the appellate court noted that "it is... important
to keep in mind the context in which the events here complained of
occurred, that is, within a corporate organization." 366 Quoting at length
from Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co.,3 6 7 the appellate court
reaffirmed the proposition that the fundamental principle of corporate
368
government is majority rule.

358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 228.
365. Id. at 229. The court specifically stated that those were issues "with which the court will
not concern itself-at least not insofar as they bear on the question of liquidation." Id. at 229
(quoting Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 184 N.E.2d 792, 796 (111. App. Ct. 1962)).
366. Id.
367. Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 32 N.E. 420 (111.1892).
368. See Coduti, 469 N.E.2d at 230. The court specifically stated that:
The record here does not support Coduti's contention that he has been deprived of his
lawful right to participate in the management of Hudson. Rather, his complaints stem
from his position as a minority shareholder and from personal disagreements with
Hellwig, neither of which form a basis for the drastic remedy of corporation
dissolution.
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Upon a denial of rehearing, the Coduti court issued an interesting
supplemental opinion. The court noted that the BCA of 1983 became
effective during the appeal and replaced the 1933 BCA.369 Coduti
argued that the case should be remanded to the trial court for further
consideration pursuant to section 12.55 of the BCA of 1983.370 The
court held, however, that the new section would not help Coduti
because he was still required to make a case under section 12.50.371
Unfortunately, because Coduti did not prove his claims under section
12.50, he was not entitled to a remedy-neither dissolution nor an
alternative remedy. 372 In the end, the oppression claim did Coduti no
good. None of Coduti's allegations were individually or collectively
availing and the oppression gloss did nothing to save them.
During both the first and second stage of the development of the
oppression doctrine, the focus was clearly on wrongdoing by the
controlling shareholder. 373 In the next stage of development, the focus
shifts, with less weight being given to actual wrongdoing by the
defendant, and more to the aspirations of those not in control.
3. Third Stage-Reasonable Expectations
After the adoption of the BCA of 1983, as noted in Coduti, the
remedies available to non-controlling shareholders are no longer limited
to dissolution as they once were. The BCA now lists a range of optional
remedies and permits the chancellor to fashion others. 374 Although
courts still describe oppression using the language of the first stage
cases, especially Central Standard and Gidwitz, oppression theory has
now evolved into something virtually unrecognizable from either of
those opinions.
Under the third, and current, phase of oppression theory, "the crux is
not identifying a traditional wrong but rather identifying the basis of the
bargain-what were the explicit or implicit conditions pursuant to

369. Id. at 231 (supplemental opinion).
370. Id. (supplemental opinion).
371. Id. (supplemental opinion). The court noted:
From the statutory language it is apparent that the new section contemplates only an
alternative remedy, rather than a distinct action. Consequently, the right to that remedy
depends upon proof of all of the elements which would have entitled a party to a
judicial dissolution, because the action must be either for dissolution or must allege the
same grounds for dissolution as set forth in Section 12.50.
Id. (supplemental opinion).
372. Id. (supplemental opinion).
373. See supra Part IV.A.1-2.
374. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b) (2000 & West Supp. 2001).
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which the parties associated themselves together in the corporate
form." 3 7 5
Illinois was among the first states to acknowledge the
reasonable expectations of shareholders. Although the Polikoff and
Jaffe courts seemed to pay little attention to the complaining
shareholders' expectations, the legislature did. The 1983 BCA counsels
the court to consider the reasonable expectations of the parties at the
376
time the venture was formed and as they developed thereafter.
While rather early on the bandwagon, Illinois was not the innovator
in adopting a "reasonable expectations" test. That distinction belongs to
New York. In 1980, the New York Supreme Court decided In re
Topper,377 a case brought by a one-third owner of two New York
corporations. 378 After having worked for twenty-five years in Florida,
the plaintiff invested his entire life savings in the corporations and
moved himself and his family to New York to participate in the new
venture. 3 79 Within a year, the plaintiff's employment with the
corporations was terminated.3 8 °
Based on those facts, the Topper court found that the other
shareholders' conduct was oppressive. 38 1 The Topper court also noted
that the plaintiff's expectations of the controlling stockholders'
obligations were valid even though his expectations were not reduced to
writing. 382

375. Murdock, supra note 23, at 465. Flowing from that rationale, "the reasonableexpectations standard may well be the quintessential illustration of the position taken by many
economists that the corporation is but a nexus of contracts, so that the role of a court in response
to a dissolution petition is to carry out the probable intent of the parties." I COX ET AL., supra
note 3, § 14.14.
376. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(d). "In determining the appropriate relief to order.., the
court may take into consideration the reasonable expectations of the corporation's shareholders as
they existed at the time the corporation was formed and developed during the course of the
shareholders' relationship with the corporation and with each other." Id.
377. In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
378. Id. at 361.
379. Id. at 362.
380. Id.
381. Id. The court held that:
Whether the controlling shareholders discharged petitioner for cause or in their good
business judgment is irrelevant. The Court finds that the undisputed understanding of
the parties was such at the time of the formation of the corporations that the
respondents' actions have severely damaged petitioner's reasonable expectations and
constitute a freeze-out of petitioner's interest; consequently, they are deemed to be
"oppressive" within the statutory framework.
Id.
382. Id. at 365. The court stated specifically:
This Court, too, recognizes that in a close corporation the bargain of the participants is
often not reflected in the corporation's charter, by-laws nor even in separate signed
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The reasonable expectations analysis reflected in Topper was a
striking departure from prior Illinois oppression cases. While attempting
to disguise the "reasonable expectations" model of oppression, Illinois
courts continued to employ rhetoric that was ill-suited to the new
reality. That clash has aggravated the prior definitional problem
endemic to oppression theory.
The first Illinois case that appears to give real weight to the
shareholder's reasonable expectations is the 1992 decision in HagerFreeman v. Spircoff.383 Show-Biz Home Video, Inc. ("Show-Biz"), was
formed by Christel Hager-Freeman, Carl Spircoff and Charles DiCaro
to operate a video rental store. 384 Each owned an equal amount of stock
and they agreed that each would serve as an officer and director of the
385
corporation and have specific jobs within the company.
After the three operated the store together for a couple of years,
disputes arose between Charles and Carl, leading Charles to inform the
other shareholders that he wished to sell his shares and leave the
business. 386 The plan as presented to Christel was that Charles would
sell his shares to Christel and Carl, so that they would end up as equal
shareholders. 387 In accordance with that plan, Christel and Carl each
deposited $5,000 with the corporation's lawyer to purchase Charles'
shares. 388 The corporation's lawyer allegedly told Christel that she need
389
not be separately represented by a lawyer in the transaction.
As it turned out, she could have used legal assistance. Without
Christel's knowledge, and with the corporation lawyer's help, Carl
bought all of Charles' Show-Biz shares, leaving him two-thirds of the
outstanding stock and control of the corporation. 39° Upon gaining

agreements. The parties' full understanding may not even be in writing but may have
to be construed from their actions. Unlike their counterparts in large corporations,
minority shareholders in small corporations often expect to participate in management
and operations. "Furthermore, there generally is an expectation on the part of some
participants that their interest is to be recognized in the form of a salary derived from
employment with the corporation." These reasonable expectations constitute the
bargain of the parties in light of which subsequent conduct must be appraised.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979)).
383. Hager-Freeman v. Spircoff, 593 N.E.2d 821 (I11.App. Ct. 1992).
384. Id. at 822.
385. Id. at 829.
386. Id. at 822, 829.
387. Id. at 822.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
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control, Carl promptly locked Christel out of the business, fired her
from her job at Show-Biz and denied her access to the corporation's
39 1
books and records.
Christel sued Carl, Show-Biz and the corporation's lawyer, claiming
that Carl and Show-Biz were guilty of oppression and that the lawyer
breached his duty to her. 392 Christel's key allegation was that Carl
deceived her about the purchase of Charles' stock and then used his illgotten majority position to improperly lock her out of the
393
corporation.
She also complained of the failure to hold shareholder or board
meetings, and she eventually took matters into her own hands by
serving notice of a special meeting of the board of directors. 394 The
meeting did not go Christel's way. Carl announced that "'as the
majority stockholder"' he planned to "'run this corporation the way it is
supposed to be run."' 395 He also introduced and passed a resolution
relieving Christel of her duties as a corporate director and officer
3 96
because they "'could not see eye-to-eye."'
Christel further alleged that the corporate minute book included
forgeries of her signature, that stock certificates were altered without
her consent and that Carl made a false entry in the books showing that
Christel owed more than $15,000 to the corporation. 397 Moreover, she
complained that Carl removed her as a signatory on all of the corporate
accounts, hid the checkbooks, changed the locks, refused to provide her
with financial statements and "deprived [her] of the opportunity to
participate in the management and business decisions of a corporation
in which [she] had invested her life savings." 39 8 To make matters
worse, Christel alleged that corporate earnings decreased dramatically
after Carl's takeover, that Carl refused to distribute profits or dividends
and that he informed Christel that she should not hold her breath
waiting for any such distributions. 399 Carl also ignored Christel's
4
demand for an accounting. 00
391.
392.
393.
394.
absence
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

Id. at 822, 829.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 824-25.
Id. at 829. It is not clear why Christel did not call for such a meeting years earlier if the
of meetings grieved her so.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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After Christel filed her lawsuit, Carl called a special shareholders'
meeting at which he refused to permit Christel to discuss business
matters. 40 1 In addition, Carl elected himself and one of his sons as two
of the three directors.40 2 Immediately thereafter, Carl held a board of
directors meeting and elected himself president and his son as
secretary, 4 3 with each slated to receive an annual salary in the amount
of $10,000, even though Carl's son was a full-time college student.4A
The trial court dismissed Christel's oppression claims, 40 5 apparently
under an analysis supported by Jaffe and Coduti.40 6 The appellate court
began its analysis with reference to the BCA provision for judicial
dissolution where those in control of the corporation act "'in a manner
that is illegal[,] oppressive or fraudulent.' 40 7 Predictably, the court
noted that oppression is not limited to "illegal" or "fraudulent" actions
4 8
or the misapplication or mismanagement of funds. 0
Significantly, the court specifically noted some of the unique aspects
of the closely-held corporation as factors bearing upon Christel's
reasonable expectations for entering into the venture: (1) Show-Biz is a
small corporation whose stock is not publicly traded, (2) Christel
invested her life savings into the business and helped manage it for
some time before Carl took over, and (3) in addition to taking control,
Carl and his son were enriched while Christel's shareholder rights were
infringed. 4°
The court analogized the case to Gidwitz,4 10 where one of two equal
shareholder factions took over and ran the corporation for years to the
exclusion of the other faction. 4 11 The court observed that the Gidwitz
court found that course of conduct to be oppressive, noting that
oppression can arise from a "continuing course of heavy-handed
conduct." 4 12 In light of that precedent, the appellate court determined
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 823.
406. See id. at 830-31 (drawing on the cases of Jaffe Commercial Fin. Co. v. Harris,456
N.E.2d 224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) and Coduti v. Hellwig, 469 N.E.2d 200 (I11.App. Ct. 1984)).
407. Id. at 830 (quoting the Illinois Business Corporation Act).
408. Id. (citing Cent. StandardII, 141 N.E.2d 45 (111. 1957)).
409. Id.
410. Gidwitz v. Lazit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1960).
411. See supra notes 94-120 and accompanying text (discussing the Gidwitz case).
412. Hager-Freeman,593 N.E.2d at 830. The court also cited with approval Notze v. Art
Gallery, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Gray v. Hall, 295 N.E.2d 506 (I11.App. Ct.
1973); and Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574 (I11.App. Ct. 1972).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

that Christel's allegations "set out a course of unfair and heavy-handed
41 3
conduct that may be fairly viewed as oppression under the statute."
4 14
The appellate court accordingly reinstated Christel's claim.
The court's analogy of Hager-Freemanto Gidwitz is odd because the
facts of Hagar-Freeman more closely parallel those of Notzke, and
Gidwitz does not explicitly address the shareholders' reasonable
expectations. 4 15 In any event, Hager-Freemen,like both Gidwitz and
Notzke, speaks in terms of "oppression," even though the result is more
justifiable on fiduciary duty grounds. Nevertheless, the result was not
surprising. After Carl and the company's lawyer duped Christel so that
Carl could become controlling shareholder, Carl was doomed in the
eyes of the law. Whether approached in terms of fraud, breach of duty
or oppression, everything that Carl did in his role as purported
controlling shareholder was tainted.
Most recently, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed a case in which a
shareholder sought relief from allegedly oppressive conduct in Schirmer
v. Bear.4 16 The case revolved around the relationship of two
stockholders in the William R. Bear Agency, Inc. ("Agency").4 17 Of the
1,000 shares of common stock issued by the Agency, William R. Bear
and his wife-who were not parties to the litigation-originally owned
750 shares and their son, defendant William F. Bear, owned 250
18
shares.

4

The plaintiff, Timothy Schirmer, joined the Agency as a broker and
also entered into two stock purchase agreements. 4 19 In the first,
William R. Bear and his wife agreed to sell 44 of their shares to Bear
and 187 shares to Schirmer. 420
Schirmer made a $10,000 down
payment toward the purchase and agreed to pay the balance of $66,670
at 9.25% annual interest per year, bringing Schirmer's total obligation,
including principal and interest to $106,000.421 Schirmer also received
an option to purchase 53 additional shares at the price of $410 per
share. 422 Under the second stock purchase agreement, the Agency
bought back Mr. and Mrs. Bear's remaining 519 shares for $212,790 at
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

Hager-Freeman,593 N.E.2d at 830.
Id. at 831.
See supra notes 213-37 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Notzke).
Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171 (111. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a 9.25% annual interest rate.42 3 The Agency's total obligation under the
agreement was424approximately $290,000, which was guaranteed by Bear
and Schirmer.
From the time Schirmer joined the Agency until about July, 1990, he
and Bear got along well with each other and the business apparently
prospered, with gross annual commissions rising from approximately
Schirmer earned a salary and annual
$180,000 to $285,000.425
426
bonuses.
Things started to turn sour, however, shortly after July,
installment payment under both stock purchase
1990, when the final
427
agreements fell due.
After the final payments were made and the corresponding stock
certificates were released, Bear and Schirmer agreed to extend the terms
of the first stock purchase agreement until Bear and Schirmer completed
a new agreement.42 8 They also agreed between themselves that the
value of the corporation was $500,000.429
Around the same time, Schirmer notified Bear that he intended to
exercise his option to purchase fifty-three additional shares under the
terms of the first stock purchase agreement. 430 Bear rejected the option
exercise and also informed Schirmer that he had "closed the books of
the Agency, thereby forgoing any bonuses or profit sharing for the
year." 43 1 Schirmer strongly protested Bear's decision to eliminate
bonuses or profit sharing for the year. 432 He also accused Bear of
wasting the Agency's assets and requested a buy-out of his stock for
$195,000, based upon the $500,000 valuation previously agreed upon
between the owners. 433 Schirmer offered to either leave the Agency or
434
remain as a salaried employee after the buyout.
The Agency's lawyer wrote to Schirmer, stating that his proposals
were deemed a resignation and offered Schirmer $76,670 for his

423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 1172-73.
428. Id. at 1172.
429. Id.
430. Id. It is unclear what Schirmer's business motivation would have been to accomplish the
purchase inasmuch as doing so would only have increased his stake from 38.9% to 44.9%,
leaving him as a minority shareholder with no additional rights. See id.
431. Id. at 1172-73.
432. Id.at 1173.
433. Id.
434. Id.
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stock,43 5 an amount apparently based upon a provision of the first stock
purchase agreement which permitted Mr. and Mrs. Bear to repurchase
Schirmer's stock if Schirmer quit or was fired for cause. 436 The
attorney also noted that if Schirmer refused to sell, he faced the prospect
of remaining a minority shareholder without distributions from the
437
Agency for a substantial period of time.
The Agency's board of directors met in August, 1990, pursuant to
notice served by Bear.438 The meeting turned out to be a shareholders'
meeting. Bear, as majority shareholder, voted to amend the Agency's
bylaws to reduce the size of the board of directors from three members
to one and elected himself as the sole director. 439 Bear also appointed
44
himself president and treasurer and appointed his wife as secretary. 0
Bear saw to it that Schirmer's name was removed from all corporate
accounts and set Schirmer's termination date, after which he was to
receive no income or benefits from the Agency. 44 1 Notably, the notice
for the directors' meeting, sent by Bear, did not include notice of a
shareholders' meeting or the topics to be addressed. 4 2
After being removed, Schirmer sued, alleging waste of corporate
assets, illegality, oppression and fraud. 443 Schirmer's basic theory was
that he had entered into the venture based upon a good faith intention to
own and operate the business with Bear, but instead Bear had merely
"used" him to finance the stock purchase agreements. an Once the
required payments were completed, Bear illegally removed him from
the Agency. 445 Schirmer sought either dissolution of the Agency or a
446
forced buyout of his shares.
The court found that Schirmer's removal as an officer and director
was "obviously illegal, but the record is devoid of any evidence that
plaintiff was harmed thereby." 447 Based upon the supplemental opinion

435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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in Coduti, 448 the trial court ruled that there was no remedy available
of the elements necessary to
because Schirmer failed to prove all
44 9
warrant dissolution of the corporation.
On appeal, the Second District Appellate Court declined to follow
Coduti and held that there is no need for a plaintiff shareholder to
establish that dissolution is justified to be entitled to relief.450 That
holding paved the way for such remedies as a buy-out of the noncontrolling shareholder's stock where the controlling shareholder's
actions-while not necessarily illegal or fraudulent-violate the
minority's "reasonable expectations., 45 1 Accordingly, the appellate
court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for a hearing to
determine the value of Schirmer's stock so that a buy-out could be
ordered.45 2
On Bear's petition, the supreme court granted leave to appeal to
address the limited question of whether, under section 12.55 of the
BCA, the plaintiff must prove grounds to justify dissolution of the
453
corporation to be entitled to the remedy of a forced share buyout.
The supreme court's opinion is essentially an exercise in statutory
construction. The court held that the plain language of section 12.55
"provides for a separate and distinct cause of action from Section
12.50" under which relief is available if the plaintiff shareholder
demonstrates that the defendant engaged in illegal, oppressive or
fraudulent conduct. 454 However, the plaintiff need not prove that the
defendant's conduct was so severe as to justify dissolving the
corporation.

4 55

Although the type of analysis applied by the Topper court has not
been explicitly adopted by Illinois judicial decisions, attention to the
reasonable expectations of the non-controlling stockholder appears to

448. Coduti v. Hellwig, 469 N.E.2d 220 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), overruled by Schirmer v. Bear,
672 N.E.2d 1171 (Ill. 1996).
449. Schirmer, 672 N.E.2d at 1173-74.
450. Schirmer v. Bear, 648 N.E.2d 1131, 1136-37 (I1. App. Ct. 1995).
451. Id.
452. Id. at 1137.
453. Schirmer, 672 N.E.2d at 1171-72. Although § 12.55 of the BCA was substantially
amended during the appeal, neither party asserted that the new provisions applied to the case and,
therefore, the court decided the case by application of § 12.55 as it stood before amendment. Id.
at 1174. The supreme court also noted that its interpretation "comports with the current statutory
scheme regulating shareholder remedies for nonpublic corporations." Id. at 1176 (citing 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 (West Supp. 1995)).
454. Id. at 1175 (quoting Kimmel v. Wirtz, 793 F. Supp. 818, 820 (N.D.Il1. 1992)).
455. Id. at 1176.
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have become a basis of decision in Illinois.456 Nationwide, recognition
of the reasonable expectations test is now so well accepted in legal
thought that it has been described as "near the center of the legal
457
universe."
The goal of shareholder protection is laudable. But it is far from
certain that the rush toward the reasonable expectations model meets
that goal or constitutes sound public policy. As noted above, two of the
primary assumptions underlying the oppression theory are that the
unique nature of the closely-held corporations calls for non-controlling
shareholder protection by means of the special oppression claim and,
second, that oppression claims are an effective means to protect those
458
shareholders.
The reported Illinois decisions addressing oppression claims in
closely-held corporations undermine those assumptions. The analysis
of those cases, set forth above, illustrates that the application of the
corporate governance provisions of the BCA-providing at least
procedural protection to those not in control-and fiduciary duty law
(applicable to those in control, either as shareholders, directors, officers
or employees)-which provides substantive protection to the noncontrolling shareholder-are truly adequate to protect non-controlling
shareholders. 459 By contrast, oppression itself has not been a significant
independent source of shareholder protection in any one of its three
stages of development. Thus, the argument that the unique nature of the
closely-held corporation makes it necessary to formulate noncontrolling shareholder remedies, not needed in other enterprises, is
seriously compromised.
B. Oppression Theory is a Disincentive to Planning
The third assumption underlying oppression theory, that an
oppression claim is necessary because shareholders of closely-held

456. The absence of explicit judicial adoption may not be surprising because the reasonable
expectations approach to oppression has "received more scholarly than judicial attention." Robert
W. Hillman, The DissatisfiedParticipantin the Solvent Business Venture: A Considerationof the
Relative Permanence of Partnershipsand Close Corporations,67 MINN. L. REv. 1,50 (1982).
Nor is it correct to conclude that Illinois courts will pay no attention to whether the controlling
shareholder has engaged in "wrongful conduct." It is more accurate to say that the definition of
"wrongful conduct" has become very malleable.
457. Donald F. Clifford, Jr., Close CorporationShareholder Reasonable Expectations: The
LargerContext, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41, 42 (1987).
458. See supra Part IH (discussing the arguments in favor of oppression theory).
459. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 34, at 241.
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corporations routinely fail to plan as they ought for corporate
governance issues, must also be questioned.
The supposed failure to plan is, in itself, difficult to understand.
Indeed, the consequences of a corporate dispute to the non-controlling
shareholder have been described as "catastrophic. ''460 Furthermore,
planning does not require much effort. Planning for the closely-held
corporate enterprise is hardly an arcane or rarely-practiced science.
Good practice requires that the lawyer advise a client who plans to enter
into a corporate enterprise (particularly as a non-controlling
shareholder) of the many planning opportunities available. 46 1 In
form books are available to assist in corporate
addition, excellent
46 2
planning.
By means of a straightforward written agreement, the shareholders
can define the relationship among themselves and between themselves
and the corporation. 463 Agreements between shareholders for control of
the closely-held corporation (such as voting trusts and similar
arrangements) and its governance are made available by statute and
enforced by the courts. 464 Restrictions on the purchase and sale of stock
are also upheld.46 5 In addition, such agreements can and should address
that each party expects to receive from
the amount and type of income
466
enterprise.
the
in
participating
Those who seek to promote remedies for oppression take a different
approach. They suggest that a non-controlling shareholder should not

460. Bahls, supra note 46, at 286.
461. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 34, at 233, 237-38; William L. Cary, How
Illinois CorporationsMay Enjoy PartnershipAdvantages: Planningfor the Closely Held Firm,
48 Nw. U. L. REV. 427 (1953).
462. See, e.g., 6-7 MARK H. JOHNSON & JACOB RABKIN, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS (Bender
1992); 3-3a CLARK A. NICHOLAS, CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL FORMS (Callagh & Co. 1994);
HOWARD M. ZARITSKY, STRUCTURING BUY-SELL AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS WITH FORMS (2d
ed. Warren, Gorham & Lamont 2000).
463. Kerry M. Lavelle, Drafting Shareholder Agreements for the Closely-Held Business, 4
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 109, 110 (1991).
464. Voting trust agreements for pooling shares for control of the corporation are specifically
endorsed by statute. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.65 (2000 & West Supp. 2001); see, e.g., Venner
1913); see also Wasserman v. Rosengarden, 406
v. Chi. City Rwy. Co., 101 N.E.2d 949 (I11.
N.E.2d 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574 (111.
App. Ct. 1972).
1964); see also Pinsof v. Pinsof, 438
465. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982).
N.E.2d 525 (I11.
466. Lavelle, supra note 463, at 128. The process of creating explicit agreements among
shareholder may be most helpful because, by doing so, the participants (and their lawyers) raise
issues which the shareholders would not have considered if not for the planning process. Id. at
129.
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be expected to take basic reasonable business steps to protect his
investment. 467 Those commentators typically couch their arguments in
terms of a need to protect the non-controlling shareholder who is
unaware of the planning opportunities available to him or unaware of
the concerns that counsel in favor of planning. 468 Some also suggest
that a kind of irrational exuberance characterizes the entry into a new
be excused
business venture so that the non-controlling shareholder may
4 69
from attending to such mundane things as advance planning.
Those arguments make little practical sense. The implied thesis is
that shareholders in closely-held corporations are "knowledgeable
enough to incorporate to obtain the benefits of favorable tax treatment
but ignorant of all other differences between corporate and partnership
law." 47 0 Yet it is difficult to believe that those shareholders are not at
least a little attuned to the idea that they should act to protect the basic
expectations that are the sine qua non of their involvement in the
corporate enterprise. Those who argue in favor of oppression theory
have failed to present evidence to support the implicit hypothesis that
of deal points that are
businessmen tend to utterly ignore documentation
47 1
critical to their business decisions.
Moreover, those commentators suggest that planning is not only
regularly omitted but actually superfluous on the premise that noncontrolling shareholders usually have certain general expectations in
467. See F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended
Reform, 33 BUS. LAW. 873, 881-82 (1978).
As minority participants in close corporations may not anticipate dissension or
oppression, and indeed may be unaware of their vulnerability, they frequently fail to
bargain for adequate protection against mistreatment. In view of this widespread
failure of minority shareholder to use self-help, commentators and legislative
draftsmen might well turn their attention to ways of providing automatic statutory
protection.
Id.
468. Id. at 883-84.
469. Murdock, supra note 23, at 426 (stating that "people enter closely-held businesses in the
same manner as they enter marriage: optimistically and ill-prepared").
470. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 34, at 250. The authors go on to argue that
"[t]here is no support for this assumption once you recognize that people have to jump through a
lot of formal hoops (assisted by counsel) to incorporate but can become partners by accident." Id.
471. This is particularly true in that
[p]articipants in the closely-held corporation are better informed about their legal rights
and obligations than participants in either partnerships or public corporations.
Investors in close corporations often put a great deal of their wealth at stake, and the
lack of diversification (compared with investors in publicly held firms) induces them to
take care.
Id. at 237; see also Hillman, supra note 456, at 68 (noting the "deliberation required for the
creation of a corporation").
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common. 4 72 Those include: benefiting from the cash flow of the
business, either through salaries from employment or dividends, and
participation in management.4 73 Some go so far as to suggest that there
should be an entitlement to a job and membership on the board for
47 4

life.

These generalized categories of expectations are a far cry from
anything one could use as a real basis to run a company. Naturally, an
investor in a closely-held corporation wants to be "involved" in the
corporation. If he did not, presumably he would use his funds for some
purpose other than buying stock. But involvement can mean anything
from toiling eighteen hours a day to sitting back and waiting for the
company to be bought out by a competitor at a huge premium. Who is
to say if the shareholders themselves do not?
Equally vexing, the various lists of supposedly universal expectations
are not the result of any empirical studies, but seem to represent
essentially their respective authors' own views about the "reasonable
expectations" of non-controlling shareholders. Those commentators
also admit that discerning what expectations should apply is a
substantial problem. 475 This may be so because the supposed
"universality" of expectations tends to break down in the cold light of
vastly varied motivations.
Even if one could settle on some kind of "universal" set of
expectations (and that seems unlikely), there is a much bigger problem.
The seemingly benevolent argument that the courts should take care of
those non-controlling shareholders who fail to take care of themselves
masks a result that is not necessarily benign. Through the application of
oppression law, it is courts, and not the corporate participants
themselves, who are charged with formulating the terms of key
agreements relating to corporate governance. The sum total of those
determinations, embodied in the decisional law, will tend to create a set
of "standard" expectations upon which non-controlling shareholders are
entitled to rely. Those rules will then be applicable to every closelyheld corporation, without regard to practical business considerations
that may render them inappropriate to a particular corporation.

472. O'Neal, supra note 467, at 886.
473. 1 COX ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 14.13-14.53; see also Bahls, supra note 46, at 323
(providing an extended list).
474. Murdock, supra note 23, at 431, 435-36; Quinlan & Kennedy, supra note 28, at 586.
475. See, e.g., Bahls, supra note 46, at 325-26 (discussing how expectations can reasonably
change over time, further confusing issues).
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By forming such a set of standards, one ironically ignores the very
considerations that led to the creation of standards in the first place-the
expectations of the particular shareholders themselves. That is, the
universal standards do not address the parties' specific circumstances,
nor do they account for the real (but largely unexpressed) economic
bargain that the parties struck.
It has been argued that the development of a set of generally
applicable principles (such as fiduciary duties) would be beneficial
because such principles form "implicit standard terms" that lower the
costs of contracting. 476 However, the cost of being wrong when
formulating that set of standards-i.e., not approximating what the
shareholders would create if they contracted on their own-is high. As
shown above, the likelihood of developing the "wrong" set of standards
is quite high, as well.477
The "wrong" set of standards means that shareholders will be forced
to live with inefficient results, or incur the costs of contracting around
an inefficient or otherwise inapplicable standard. If the standards are
interpreted not as defaults but as imperatives, there will be no option but
to live with the inefficient result-or incorporate in some jurisdiction
that has not designated its judges as better able to form contracts than its
businesspeople. Thus, the very efficiency that proponents of oppression
theory promote results in substantial inefficiency.
C. ControllingShareholdersare Left Without Clear Guidelinesfor
Avoiding Oppressive Behavior
One might argue that those who seek a set of standards to protect
non-controlling shareholders from the overreaching of those in control
would be best advised to start at the source. That is, to approach the
problem by setting forth a clear standard of conduct that is expected of
the controlling shareholder so that both the controlling and noncontrolling shareholders understand their respective rights and
obligations in the context of corporate governance. Doing so would
satisfy a basic goal of corporation law, to provide a "principled and
are
coherent set of regulations to ensure that those who hold 4power
78
accountable to those who are dependent upon its fair exercise."

476. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporationsand Agency Costs, 38
STAN. L. REV. 271, 291 (1986).
477. See supra notes 472-74 and accompanying text (discussing the possible general
expectations of non-controlling shareholders).
478. Mitchell, supra note 61, at 1675.
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But the modem formulation of the oppression claim in Illinois fails to
do so in that the contours of what conduct may constitute oppression are
not definite, but are strikingly vague and changeable. The concept is
now so nebulous that it is essentially impossible to predict what conduct
479
may be viewed in hindsight as oppressive.
This situation is true for several reasons. First, the controlling
shareholder does not necessarily know the non-controlling shareholder's
reasonable expectations. Second, the reasonable expectations test may
impress upon the controlling shareholder different standards of behavior
depending upon which non-controlling shareholder (or group of noncontrolling shareholders) he is dealing with. Third, the reasonable
expectations test may saddle the controlling shareholder with standards
of behavior that are inconsistent with, or directly contrary to, his other
legal obligations.
First, the non-controlling shareholder's expectations, reasonable or
not, may not be known to the controlling shareholder. Even proponents
of a view of oppression that recognizes the non-controlling
shareholder's reasonable expectations admit that these are often "just
vague and half-articulated understandings." 480 Although some have
suggested that an expectation is by definition reasonable only if known
to the controlling shareholder, 4 81 Illinois has not adopted such a
qualification. It is the height of folly to expect that a controlling
shareholder will necessarily abide by the unexpressed, albeit deeply
held, expectation of a non-controlling shareholder.
The almost inevitable result of holding the controlling shareholder to
a standard of which he is unaware is that eventually the controlling
shareholder interferes with the non-controlling shareholder's
expectations, leading to dissension within the corporation. For those
who contend that the problem is resolved simply by ongoing
consultation with non-controlling shareholders, the solution is not so
simple.
A second difficulty (and one not solved by consultation in a
corporation with more than two shareholders) is that dependence upon
the expectations of individual shareholders will almost certainly create
differing, and sometimes conflicting, standards of behavior for the

479. To make matters worse, courts have expressed themselves on the topic of oppression in
hopelessly broad rhetoric that does not necessarily match the actual results of the cases. See
supra Part IV.A. 1-2 (discussing Illinois cases).
480. O'Neal, supra note 467, at 886.
481. 1 COX ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 14.13-14.51; Bahls, supra note 46, at 324; Hillman,
supra note 456, at 77-79.
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controlling shareholder. 482 Yet the controlling shareholder is expected
to conform his behavior to the (perhaps unexpressed) requirements of
each of those shareholders. That is distinctly unlike the fiduciary duty
concept, under which the controlling shareholder's conduct is judged by
a single standard as to all of his fellow shareholders.
Third, a controlling shareholder's conduct may be deemed oppressive
although not contrary to law or even when it is explicitly approved in
the law. 483 For example, conduct that is often cited as oppressive in
shareholder litigation is failing to elect or re-elect the non-controlling
shareholder to a seat on the board of directors or appoint him as an
officer.4 84 Yet those are functions of voting by shareholders and
directors that are, and should be, controlled by the majority. Likewise,
terminating the non-controlling shareholder's employment with the
corporation is often alleged to be oppressive, even though decisions
regarding hiring and firing are vested in the corporation's officers, who
are appointed by the board of directors, which is in turn elected by
majority vote of the shareholders. 485 Thus, a right that the law provides
to the controlling shareholder may be threatened or potentially
eliminated with reference to an oppression analysis.
The controlling shareholder's dilemma is obvious. A review of
Illinois case law will do little to equip him with a useful normative
definition of oppression. 486 On the other hand, reference to the
"reasonable expectations" test informs the controlling shareholder that
he need not even bother reading the decisional law. He should instead
attempt to determine the "reasonable expectations" of the noncontrolling shareholders. Or, perhaps more to the point, what the noncontrolling shareholders might claim, in a suit seeking shareholder
remedies, that their reasonable expectations were. Thus, to meet the
challenges of running a closely-held Illinois corporation, the controlling

482. By way of further complications, some commentators suggest that the degree to which
reasonable expectations should be considered by courts depends upon the nature of the individual
relationships between the shareholders. O'Neal, supra note 467, at 885-86. This approach has
also been criticized. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 456, at 64.
483. The reasonable expectations model may provide remedies to the non-controlling
shareholder who is "generally dissatisfied with some aspect of his or her role in the business but
who has not been the victim of misconduct by those in control." Hillman, supra note 456, at 3.
484. Quinlan & Kennedy, supra note 28, at 586.
485. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.50, 8.55 (2000).
486. The very vagueness of the term has been hailed as desirable because "any attempt to
define 'oppressive' would tend to reduce the flexibility of the provision" in light of the varied
circumstances which may give rise to oppression. Hillman, supra note 456, at 44 n. 134 (quoting
Comment, supra note 21, at 140-41).
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shareholder must not only be an astute businessperson, but also a mind
reader and a seer. A tall order indeed.
D. Oppression Theory Promotes the Highly Inefficient Result of
CorporateGovernance by Unanimity
Modern oppression theory is also objectionable because it effectively
makes all shareholders a "controlling" shareholder for at least some
purposes. Even a single shareholder who opposes a corporate action
may feel his reasonable expectations trampled upon and may resort to a
lawsuit (or the threat of a lawsuit) claiming oppression. The result is
that a controlling shareholder's only safe harbor from shareholder
litigation may be government by unanimity.
That result implicates a number of substantial costs. Failure to
achieve unanimity will result in paralysis. 487 Knowing that, the noncontrolling shareholder may be encouraged to demand concessions in
exchange for his assent to a corporate action. 488 The result in any
event-deadlock, opportunistic behavior by the non-controlling
shareholder, or shareholder litigation-is inefficiency created or
aggravated by the oppression theory.
Before oppression became a real doctrine in Illinois corporate law, it
was well recognized that the basic rule of corporate governance was
shareholder majority rule:
It is... fundamental in the law of corporations that the majority of its
stockholders shall control the policy of the corporation, and regulate
and govern the lawful exercise of its franchise and business. Everyone
purchasing or subscribing for stock in a corporation impliedly agrees
that he will be bound by the acts and proceedings done or sanctioned
by a majority of the shareholders, or by the agents of the corporation
duly chosen by such 489
majority, within the scope of the powers
conferred by the charter.
The so-called Majority Rule Doctrine was firmly established in
Illinois corporate law, 490 but seems to have given way under the
487. EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 34, at 248.
488. Id.
489. Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 32 N.E. 420, 423 (I11.1892) (citations omitted).
The principle that corporations are governed by the board of directors is codified in the BCA:
"[E]ach corporation shall have a board of directors and the business and affairs of the corporation
shall be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors." 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/8.05 (2000 & West Supp. 2001).
490. The Majority Rule Doctrine holds that, upon subscription for stock, an investor impliedly
consents to corporate policies as determined by the majority. Bahis, supra note 46, at 292; see
also Linda L. Shapiro, Note, Involuntary Dissolution of Close Corporationsfor Mistreatment of
Minority Shareholders,60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1119, 1149 (1982).
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modern application of oppression theory. The requirement that the
controlling shareholder must not transgress any shareholder's
"reasonable expectations" means that the "fundamental" law of
corporations that "the majority of its stockholders shall control the
policy of the corporation, and regulate and govern the lawful exercise of
492
its franchise and business" 49 1 is no longer a dependable touchstone.
Rather, where control of the policy and business of the corporation is
limited by the non-controlling shareholder's "reasonable expectations,"
that consideration may, of result, be contrary to the course which the
controlling shareholders would otherwise seek.
Because oppression claims focus upon changes or proposed changes
in the corporation or its operation which impinge upon a noncontrolling shareholder's expectations, oppression may be thought of in
practical effect as the violation by a controlling shareholder of an
implied contract between shareholders. As with an implied contract,
oppression is the violation of an implicit agreement or agreements
among shareholders. Key to the implied contract, which underlies
oppression claims, is that the parties (i.e., the shareholders) entered into
business together with the intention that no fundamental change to the
corporation or its operation will be undertaken without the assent of the
non-controlling shareholder.
The much more rational conclusion to be drawn from the formation
of a corporation in which one shareholder (or more than one
shareholder, acting together) has voting control and one or more
shareholders lack voting control is that the shareholders entered into
that arrangement with the intent that the democratic process proceed
and that the controlling shareholder(s) would employ the natural
prerogatives of control. Indeed, one might argue that the only
reasonable expectation of a minority shareholder is that he will be
outvoted every time unless he contracts to protect himself from that
result. Under the guise of reasonable expectations, oppression theory
interferes with that entirely reasonable interpretation of the parties
expectation.
At a minimum, the introduction and continuing expansion of the
oppression concept means that corporate decisions cannot be
accomplished by majority vote, but that both the controlling and noncontrolling shareholders must be in accord on all major corporate
decisions. That result is much more than the participation by the non491. Wheeler, 32 N.E. at 423.
492. When courts apply the principle of majority rule in close corporations, they often
disappoint the reasonable expectation of minority participants. O'Neal, supra note 467, at 884.
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controlling shareholder in corporate affairs that the law would otherwise
require. 493 It amounts to vesting in the non-controlling shareholder a
veto power for at least some purposes. Under that state of affairs, one
may reasonably ask why anyone would risk the capital necessary to gain
a controlling ownership position when one percent might be enough to
veto actions not to one's liking (i.e., not in accordance with- one's
"reasonable expectations").
The availability of an oppression claim is complicated further if there
are disagreements (or differing expectations) among several noncontrolling shareholders. In that event, when majority rule may be most
urgently needed to keep the corporate enterprise moving forward, a
controlling shareholder is most vulnerable to claims of oppression. He
risks frustrating not merely one shareholder's reasonable expectations
but simultaneously transgressing the differing expectations of numerous
shareholders. In a regime that stresses individual expectations of
minority participants over the good of the enterprise as a whole, the
corporation loses the ability to act decisively and, as a result, loses the
ability to take timely advantage of corporate opportunities.
E. Oppression Theory Tends to Increase the Cost and Severity of
ShareholderDisputes
The problems inherent in the use of oppression as a basis for
shareholder remedies, as outlined above, are on full display in
shareholder litigation. On the one hand, the controlling shareholder
defendant is likely to be thoroughly convinced (whether accurately or
not) that he has done nothing more than fulfill his mandate to run the
corporation.
On the other hand, the non-controlling shareholder plaintiff may
believe that his reasonable expectations have been frustrated. The very
indefinite nature of oppression encourages such plaintiffs to introduce
(or devise) evidence of every real or imagined wrong or slight
supposedly committed by those in control of the corporation. 494 The
result is lots of heat but little light, needlessly taxing scarce judicial
resources and senselessly increasing costs to all of the litigants.4 95
In the middle is the court, charged with the unenviable task of
presiding over a type of dispute that is typically emotionally charged
and characterized by a level of personal animosity absent in many other
493.
494.
lawsuit
495.

See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.05, 7.40(2000 & West Supp. 2001).
There is a real danger of reference to expectations that are "unilateral at the time the
is filed." Bahls, supra note 46, at 325.
Id. at 327.
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types of business litigation. One of the court's goals is to discern
whether the reasonable expectations of the non-controlling shareholder
have been frustrated by the controlling shareholder whose actions may
otherwise comply with the law but may nevertheless constitute
oppression.
As illustrated above, the court approaches that difficult mission with
little guidance in the case law. 496 If the court views its duty as
discerning a subjective reasonable expectation, it will base its decision
mainly upon evidence of the non-controlling shareholder's actual
expectations as of the time he joined the enterprise and as they
developed thereafter. The problems presented by such a post hoc
determination of largely subjective matters is obvious when the noncontrolling shareholder has every reason to expand the scope of his
supposed expectations to the greatest possible extent.
The list of "expectations" that litigants can come up with when
pressed is virtually limitless. Take, for example, one commentator's
suggestion that shares sold by a non-controlling shareholder to the
corporation or to the controlling shareholder should not be subject to a
minority discount because to do so "would frustrate the reasonable
expectation of all shares having equal value." 497 Of course, there is no
economic rationality to that expectation, as reflected in the common
control premium phenomenon in which a buyer is willing to pay more
per share for controlling stock than for non-controlling stock.49 8 But
what non-controlling shareholder-in the context of litigation-would
not be willing to testify that he expected that his minority shares would
have equal value with those shares entitled to control the corporation?
Alternatively, the court may adhere to an objective expectations test,
in which the court is left to define the non-controlling shareholder's
wants and limit the controlling shareholder's control when the parties
did not (or could not) do so themselves. 499 There is great difficulty
inherent in that approach, as well. There is the initial problem of
defining standards, as discussed above. Further complicating matters, a
set of standards may be uniformly applied within the context of a single

496. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of guidance in
defining oppressive conduct); see also Douglas K. Moll, ShareholderOppression v. Employment
at will in the Close Corporation: The Investment Model Solution, !999 U. ILL. L. REV. 517
(1999).
497. Bahls, supra note 46, at 303.
498. Zenichi Shisido, The Fair Value of Minority Stock in Closely Held Corporations, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 65, 84 (1993).
499. 1 COXETAL., supra note 3, §§ 14.13-14.52.
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case but different chancellors are quite likely to interpret the standards
in vastly differing ways, so that the test is not objective after all.
That vagueness of standards and unpredictability of results tends to
discourage an early end to litigation. When the parties are unable to
accurately predict how courts might decide a matter, they have
difficulty negotiating a solution.50 0 Some commentators have suggested
that the transaction costs of shareholder litigation are particularly
wasteful because, regardless of the nature of the underlying allegations,
50 1
the usual remedy is a forced buy-out of the complaining shareholder.
Therefore, they argue that the court's legitimate (or at least most
efficient) role is as a price-fixing mechanism in the absence of a
market.502
Whatever result emerges from such litigation is likely to bear little
relationship to any course of events that any shareholder anticipated
upon entering into the enterprise. But that, after all, is the ultimate
outcome-and fundamental weakness-of oppression theory. After
having paid a high cost (in terms of efficiency) for the overlay of
oppression theory, participants in the corporate enterprise are left
without a predictable outcome. Truly the worst of both worlds.
V.

CONCLUSION

The high costs and relative lack of utility of oppression theory are
clearly reflected in the Illinois cases. Without oppression, noncontrolling shareholders in Illinois closely-held corporations would be
fully protected by other legal doctrines. Those factors strongly indicate
that maintaining oppression as a basis for shareholder remedies in
Illinois is not wise public policy. As Illinois has led the way in the
development of corporate governance law in the past, it should do so
again. Oppression should be eliminated from the BCA and common
law as a basis for shareholder remedies.

500. Robert Cooter et al., Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic
Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 228 (1982).
501. J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael R. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close CorporationProblem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1977).
502. Id.

